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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LIGHTS AT MASS.

THE Church employs wax, the fruit of the bee, in her liturgical service. In the celebration of the holy mysteries she admits no other light: "*Nulla lumina nisi cerea vel supra mensam altaris vel eidem quomodocumque imminetia adhibeantur.*"<sup>1</sup> Neither a venerable tradition, which had its origin in the darkness of the catacombs, nor the lawful desire of throwing a special splendor around the Christian worship are the real causes of this stringent law. We might glean this from the very fact that theologians without exception account it a "*peccatum mortale*" to celebrate without light, and even if a priest have proceeded in the Mass to the very consecration, and the lights fail, he is to desist from continuing the holy sacrifice. Whether it be lawful to celebrate for the purpose of giving the viaticum to a dying person when it would be impossible to procure lights for the holy sacrifice has thus far remained an unsettled question between the gravest moralists. Nor can the defect be supplied, without special dispensation, by any other but wax-light, as is

<sup>1</sup> S. R. C. Decr. 31 Mart. 1821.



evident from the authorized teaching of Catholic liturgists.<sup>1</sup>

The object, then, of the Church employing lights in her worship is not to dispel the material darkness, nor simply to enhance the splendor of her ritual. It has a higher sense. Light on her altars, and wherever it is prescribed as part of her religious service, is distinctly a symbol of religious truth and an expression of sacred mystery. And the meaning of the religious truth and of the sacred mystery thus symbolized depends to a large extent on the material of which the liturgical light is composed. The prayers of the Church and her blessing lose their application if this material be changed. In the matter of lights for the Mass she speaks only of bees-wax, and she gives us in the prayers of her ritual the reasons why she means to bless the fruit of the bee. Nor are the words of the Bride of Christ an idle form of speech. The benison which issues from her lips imparts a sacramental virtue to the lights which she blesses. The heavenly power communicated to the created objects dispels the clouds which shroud the demons, and cures the manifold ills of human souls and human bodies; for He who gave healing power to many plants in the first creation, imparts similar power to other creatures by the second creation, in which the face of the earth is to be renewed.

In making use of wax as the instrument by which to communicate special blessings, and to teach certain truths of faith, and to symbolize certain mysteries of religion, the Church has respect to the qualities which render this particular material an apt expression of her threefold purpose. She refers in the opening prayer on the feast of the Purification, when she blesses the lights destined for the liturgical service, to the wax before her as the product of the bee. "Deus, qui omnia ex nihilo creasti, et jussu tuo per opera apum hunc

<sup>1</sup> Sine ullo autem *cereo* cum solo lumine ex alia materia, ut oleo, sebo, celebrare, *per se*, secundum communem sententiam grave peccatum censetur esse; attamen non ita grave, ut non causa mediocriter gravis prorsus excuset. Vd. S. Alphons. . . . Imo Gobat, Suarez aliique id pro uno alterove casu ex sola devotione concedunt licite fieri, si *cereus haberi non possit*.—Lehmke., P. II., 233, 4.



liquorem ad perfectionem cerei venire fecisti." The working bee has ever been proverbially an image of virginity. The wax which she yields as the fruit of assiduous labor is possessed of an aromatic fragrance which combines the sweet but tempered odors of the flowers whence she has gathered her honey. Its refined color has a delicacy and pearly softness which, while it reflects perfect purity, retains the natural color peculiar to itself and distinguishable from that artificial whiteness which indicates absence of color rather than anything positive. The extraordinary cleanliness of the bee, not allowing a speck of dust in her hive, and the care and labor which she expends in gathering and preparing the wax for the holding of "the fruit which has the chiefest sweetness,"<sup>1</sup> suggest the idea of a vessel chastened and cleansed by laborious care. When finally the same material has been fashioned into a light for the Catholic worship, wherein it yields through a living flame the gathered fragrance, and diffuses the soft and steady lustre of its native elements to be consumed for the glory of the Most High, it has reached the end for which the Church consecrated it in her service.

The burning wax light on the altar is the mystic image of the God-Man, the stainless holocaust offered for the sins and unto the sanctification of man. The purity and virginal qualities of the bee fitly represent the Virgin Mother, who, free from original as from actual sin, brings forth the Light of the World, which is to enlighten those who sit in the shadow of death; which is to be consumed as a burnt-offering, a votive sacrifice filling the heavens and earth with the sweetness of its odor and shedding a grateful lustre upon the worship of our altars.

The Ambrosian Missal, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, makes a beautiful allusion to the flower of Jesse, whence the Bl. Virgin, symbolized by the bee, derives the sweet odor of her heavenly fruit, whom the inspired

<sup>1</sup> Eccclus. xi. 3.



writer calls the flower of the field and lily of the valley."<sup>1</sup>

There is, indeed, a singular propriety in the fact that these lights representing the Christ are blessed with expressive solemnity on the feast of the Purification of Our Bl. Lady. She, the lily elect of Israel, exempt by a wonderful privilege of divine mercy from the necessity of being purified, offers in the Temple on this day the fruit of her chaste womb, that through Him all the world may be purified, not only from original but from actual sin.

Durandus, and many other liturgical writers with him, understand the burning wax lights upon our altars to be an image of Christ in the following manner: The wax itself signifies the pure body of our divine Lord, a sacrifice to His heavenly Father, to be consumed for love of man upon the altar of the cross. The cord or wick, which draws up the wax toward the flame, is the soul, the medium, as it were, which joins the two natures of God and man in the one divine person. The burning flame signifies the divinity, the eternal love, the celestial light drawing all hearts toward itself, annihilating what is human or converting it into a heavenly sacrifice, the sweet odors of which arise daily to the throne of the Eternal Father.

It has been said that all material light has its source in the sun; that the illuminating gas which we draw from the coal hidden in the earth was originally stored there by the action of the sunlight, and by concentrating in its dark recess has generated a power apparently distinct. The same might be said of the diamond, whose remarkable brilliancy comes to us seemingly from the deepest darkness. But by a natural

<sup>1</sup> "Quid enim magis accommodum, magis testivum, quam ut Jesseico flori floreis excubemus et tædis? Præsertim cum et sapientia de semetipsa cecinerit: Ego sum flos agri et liliū convallium."

The following words, with which the above preface in the Ambrosian Missal continues, expressly deprecate the use of any other material than beeswax in this blessing: *Ceras igitur nec pinus exusta desudat, nec crebris sauciata bipennibus cedrus illacrymat, sed est illis arcana de virginitate creatio, et ipsæ transfiguratione nivei candoris albescent.*—Cf. Gühr, *Messopfer*, II., § 31, note.



instinct, light, and particularly the light of the sun, has among all nations been considered as a symbol of the Divinity. We see, then, in the material light a participation in the divine personality and attributes. These attributes are reflected in a singular manner in the burning light. The ideas of brightness, of beauty, of truth, of spirituality are all synonymous with that of light. The flame of fire is to our minds something distinct; yet it may communicate itself to all things around it and convert them into its own substance or annihilate them. But it creates as well as annihilates. There is no material power on earth which may not be controlled by the element of fire. It becomes the generator of heat, which in turn moves everything around it. Man may utilize it by drawing it into certain channels which his intelligence teaches him to construct; but even when not so used it acts silently upon every object within its reach, setting the tiny particles of the air in motion, and thus generating gradually a power which confronts us at some time in a sudden change of the things we have been accustomed to see. And what is here said of the material light is applicable to the spiritual light, the divine nature of Our Lord. Distinct in His personality, He is nevertheless communicable to every soul not only through grace, but by and in His very nature of God and man, when the creature communicates in the Bl. Eucharist. The presence of that "Light of the world," in the hypostatic union, annihilates the darkness; it generates new life and motion; it offers itself as an instrument in the hands of weak man to control every power on earth; it silently and gradually and orderly, yet irresistibly, draws all things to itself. It spiritualizes our human nature, and converting it into a warmer and subtler matter, raises us to heaven, attracted to the Eternal Sun, in whose beauty it is to be absorbed.

Moreover, as the material light sheds its lustre upon the things around it, dispelling the darkness which prevents us from recognizing them as they are, and at the same time gives to them the peculiar beauty which only light can add to earth-



ly objects—so the symbolized light of Christ is, in the words of holy Simeon, a light for the revelation unto the gentiles and a glory to the chosen people of God, “*lumen ad revelationem gentium, et gloriam plebis tuæ Israel.*” It reveals the truth, whilst it dispels the darkness of sin and error, and the gloom that hovers about everywhere outside of the gate of heaven. How aptly the antiphon chanted during the procession on this day of the Purification sets forth this idea: “*Adorna thalamum tuum, Sion. . . . amplectere Mariam, quæ est cœlestis porta: ipsa enim portat regem gloriæ novi luminis: Subsistit Virgo, adducens manibus Filium ante luciferum genitum.*” Yes, the Sun of Justice, begotten before the star of day, whom the Virgin Mother leads by the hand, is the Eternal Truth, the Unchangeable Beauty, the Splendor of the Glory of the Father. As it reveals and enlightens and beautifies, so, like the sun above in the sky, it warms and fructifies. Hence the priest, as he blesses the symbolic candle, prays that, illumined and taught by the doctrine of the heavenly light, we may not only recognize it as it is, but faithfully embrace it in a living charity. “*Ut Spiritus sancti gratia illuminati atque edocti te veraciter agnoscamus et fideliter diligamus.*”

But whilst the light of truth and grace opens our minds and hearts to the teaching of the Gospel and the observance of the law of Christian charity, we learn another lesson from the burning wax candle upon our altars. As its fragrance rises to heaven, as its light unites with the rays of the sun, the wax is being consumed. We have said that the wax signifies the spotless Body of Christ. In the pure fruit of a spotless body we discover every excellent quality of the Virgin who brought it forth. The religious instinct of the pagans caused them to assign to the bee an origin partly divine, partly human, and to believe that Ceres, injured in the cruel death of her friend Melissa, found her noble revenge in bestowing upon the children of men this small yet most richly gifted and beneficent of animals. The Greeks and



Romans saw in this "bird of the muses"<sup>1</sup> a messenger and warning of heaven. In the Hebrew language the root from which the word which signifies Bee (*Deborah*) is formed, is the same for the word *oracle*, and, what may seem even more remarkable, for the Greek *logos*, the latin *verbum*, in the sense in which we apply it to the Incarnate Word of God. One of its significations is the *inner Sanctuary of the Temple*.<sup>2</sup> Whether or not the connection of ideas in these cases has any other source than the accidents of human invention, it is a fact, as naturalists who have closely observed the labor of the bee assure us, that this little animal combines in its nature and activity all the qualities which distinguish the most virtuous intelligence.<sup>3</sup> A delicate sense of purity, which does not tolerate the least dust in the hive; a devotion to labor and a care in the selection of the material for the production of wax and honey; a swiftness in its movements and a directness toward the end which suggest both diligence and purity of motive, make its work justly one

<sup>1</sup> The bee was called *musis dicata*, *volucris musarum*. Dio mentions that the entire Roman army took it as a sign of some prodigious omen when a swarm of bees deposited their wax upon the altar. *Eorum aris ceras apes allinebant*. Cf. Sil. Ital., VIII., 634, annot. edit. Dausq. Sanct. edit. 1618, where other similar examples are cited.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Gesenius, *Lex. Hebr.*, *dabar*, to speak

<sup>3</sup> Not only have they a perfectly organized community, with exact discipline, fixed methods of building, provisioning, hygiene (artificial ventilation) and economy; but they exhibit what has all the appearance of certain virtuous instincts, such as extreme deference and care for the queen and for the weaker members of the hive. Whilst they do not tolerate idlers (the drones are ejected or killed), you will find a strong bee begin the building of a cell, and let a weaker one finish it, whilst she goes to the next work. They have regular nursing bees, who do all the light housework and feed the young, first chewing the pollen so that it might be the easier digested by the baby bee. It was from careful examination of the cells of the bee that mathematicians have learned to solve the problem of combining efficiently the greatest strength with the largest capacity and the least expenditure of material. In short, the virtues of scrupulous purity, constant devotion to their tasks, consummate skill, which has all the appearance of exact calculation, even under exceptional circumstances, together with a union which makes them one and formidable against any foe who disturbs their peaceful labor, show that the precious fruits of wax and honey are not the results of low qualities.



which men prize. And as the bee bears no other fruit than this, we see in it the emblem of the sacred body which is to be consumed a sacrifice for the benefit of man. Thus the burning taper upon our altars speaks to us of the suffering life of Our Saviour that is to end in the death of the cross, being spent for our enlightenment and our healing. It is a life which teaches us, in the burning love exhibited in the thirty three years, every virtue to the most exalted degree. When the Christ is dead, when the solemn chants of Holy Week entone the *Tenebræ*, the Church employs unbleached wax, as she does in the office of the dead, in order to mark the change in the body, now lifeless, which is symbolized by the wax.

Such is briefly the meaning of the tapers which are kept burning upon our altars during the Holy Sacrifice, and which are employed in the liturgical service wherever they are expressly prescribed. The material of wax is chosen above all the rest, because it is so precious and because it is so full of symbolical significance. A less precious material would not be the proper instrument for the sacramental virtue which the Church communicates in her blessing of the candles, and the same reasons which cause her to exact gold and silver for the vessels of the Eucharistic service, induce her to adorn her altars only with the precious fruit of the virginal bee: *quatenus sic administret lumen exterius, ut lumen Spiritus Sancti nostris non desit mentibus interius.*

THE EDITOR.

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### MARRIAGE DISPENSATIONS IN THE CASE OF JEWS.

ACCORDING to the traditional law of the Church, a marriage between a Catholic and a person not validly baptized is null and void, and in order to its validity, requires a dispensation from the Sovereign Pontiff. In Catholic countries this dispensation is restricted; but in the United



States, and missionary countries generally, where mixed congregations abound, special faculties are granted to the bishops by which they may dispense in such cases according to prudent judgment. Among the "Facultates Extraordinariæ D," which are usually given without limitation, to our bishops for use within their jurisdiction, is the following, n. 2 :

"Dispensandi cum subditis exceptis Italis<sup>1</sup> de quibus non constat Italicum domicilium omnino deseruisse, atque excepto insuper casu Matrimonii *cum viro vel muliere Judæis*, super impedimento disparitatis cultus, quatenus sine contumelia Creatoris fieri possit, et dummodo cautum omnino sit conditionibus ab Ecclesia præscriptis ac præsertim de amovendo a Catholico conjuge perversionis periculo, deque conversione conjugis infidelis pro viribus curanda, ac de universa prole utriusque sexus in Catholicæ Religionis sanctitate omnino educanda : servata in reliquis adjecta instructione, etc."

It will be noticed that the above faculty contains a limiting clause. The dispensations from the impediment called "disparitatis cultus," in which the validity of a marriage is in question, cannot be applied to a Catholic who intends to contract marriage with a Jew.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The restriction in regard to "Itali" no longer exists.

<sup>2</sup> The reason of this limitation is not to be found in any unjust discrimination against the Jews, but in the more positive danger to which a Catholic who marries a Jew is exposed of losing his or her faith. In all other respects the Church has invariably treated the Jewish people with great respect, not only protecting them from aggression of fanatical believers in Christianity, but building them synagogues and allowing them the full liberty of exercising their religion in Rome and other centres of Catholicity. Examples of this kind abound in the history of the Popes, and special laws to this effect are found in the Theodosian and Justinian codes. Nevertheless, the extreme tendency of the Jews to form castes, and their almost instinctive detestation of all that is Christian, which allow them to make no compromises, render it morally certain that a Catholic who marries a Jew will have to forego, for the sake of domestic peace, the privileges of his or her religion. On this account the laws of the Church are exceptionally stringent in regard to marriages between Catholics and Jews, and, as a matter of fact, they hardly ever occur unless the Jewish party shows a disposition to accept the true faith. Catholics do not and cannot accept revelation as meaningless, and the religion which they profess is to them the one true message and command of God, by which they abide at the risk of all else on earth.



With the advance of rationalism in modern Jewish society, the strict adherence to the law of Moses, which is supposed to characterize the true Hebrew, has yielded to the adoption of various so-called reforms, which reduce the belief of many persons of Jewish descent to a mere philanthropic cult. They discard the ancient and distinctive mark of their faith, circumcision, and from a religious point of view can no longer be called Jews. A question has thus been raised as to the interpretation or application of the above-mentioned faculty to persons who have entirely abandoned the Jewish cult, and are thus only Hebrews in race or by descent. The S. Congregation of the Office, on being questioned on the point, answers that the word *Judæis* used in the faculty referred to embraces all Jews, whether they are circumcised and practise their religion, or not. The following is the original document embodying the decision, which, as the date shows, was given last April a year ago, but was not made public, as the question had been answered at the request of a local prelate. We understand, however, that its publication will interest many bishops who have had practical doubts on the subject.

EX S. CONGREGATIONE S. OFFICII.

Romæ, Die V. Aprilis, 1889.

Illmo e Rmo Signore,

*Nella Congregazione di feria V. 3 corrente, proposto il quesito di N.N., in qual conto, trattandosi di dispense matrimoniali, debbano tenersi quegli Ebrei che non osservano punto le pratiche della loro religione, anzi i più non sono neppure circoncisi, gli Eminentissimi Cardinali Inquisitori Generali hanno decretato:*

*Respondeatur in usu Formulæ D. n. 3 de Propaganda Fide: Hebræos de quibus agitur non esse excipiendos.*

*Colgo, etc., etc.*

S. CRETONE Segretario.

*Cfr. il numero 5845-1888.*



It may be in order to advert here to a difficulty which is of not unfrequent occurrence in these days. If a Protestant, validly baptized, is married to a Jew, and both wish to become Catholics, are we to treat their marriage as invalid, and must they renew their mutual consent after having been received into the Church? Benedict XIV answers the question in the affirmative. The Protestant, in this case, simply makes a profession of faith, and the Jew is baptized. After this they revalidate the marriage by renewing their mutual consent. "Exorta, uti accepimus," writes the Sovereign Pontiff to Cardinal Henry of York, in a letter dated Feb. 9th, 1749, "hæc controversia est, utrum scilicet, cum Hebræus e secta Protestantium uxorem duxerit, quæ aut hæresim ejuravit aut ejurandæ parata est, utrum, inquam, initum matrimonium post acceptum ab Hebræo Baptisma, sit iterandum. Te igitur hac nostra epistola certiore facimus, ambos, postquam Catholicæ fidei nomen dederint, per Baptismum alter, altera per hæresis detestationem, rursus esse matrimonii vinculo conjungendos. Nam quod ante inierant, irritum omnino fuit propter impedimentum dirimens, quod vocatur disparitatis cultus."

Cf. Bullar. Bened. XIV., tom. III., p. 4. Edit. Rom. 1753.

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## THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY.

### I.

**S**ILVESTER Maurus heads his list of Philosophical Problems with this query: Must *Perfect Knowledge* explain things by their causes? <sup>1</sup> True to his Aristotelian instinct, he looks for the predicate in the definition of the subject. Knowledge, he argues, is essentially representative. Perfect knowledge, therefore, must be perfectly representative. An object is perfectly represented in the mind when its

<sup>1</sup> Quæstionis Philos., Q. I. —Utrum cognitio perfecta debeat esse per causam rei,



mental state is in right accord with its extra-mental mode of being. In the latter condition the object is *per causam*. Therefore, so must it be when perfectly reflected in and by the mind. Again, equally faithful to the Philosopher, he appeals to experience for verification of his *a priori* argument. Knowledge is imperfect so long as it leaves the mind restless and curious for deeper knowing. It becomes perfect only when the mind rests and asks no longer the "why" of things. But knowledge of an effect, with ignorance of the cause, leaves reason uneasy and curious as to the existence and nature of the cause; whilst the knowledge of the cause gained by means of its effect, leaves the mind in unrest regarding the manner in which it came to know the cause—*de ipso modo cognoscendi causam*. Only when we know the cause, and through it look out upon the effect, is our natural curiosity satisfied. Thus we see how the Aristotelian definition of science, or perfect knowledge—*cognitio rei per causam*—rests upon the verdict of consciousness.

Commenting on the truism in which the Philosopher generalizes the fact of experience that "all men *naturally* desire perfect knowledge,"<sup>1</sup> St. Thomas finds a triple reason for this universal phenomenon. First, in the native condition of the human mind. All things naturally tend towards their own perfection. By nature the mind is in an incomplete condition; it is ever passing from potentiality to act. Knowledge completes or perfects it. Hence its ceaseless craving for perfect knowledge. Again, there is in every thing a spontaneous tendency to emit its peculiar form of energy. But intellectual action or energy, which reaches below the outer phenomena, and reads, as it were, beneath the surface the underlying causes and inter-relations of things, is the specific activity of mind. Hence again the radical, native striving of mind for perfect knowledge. Lastly, things are perfected when they reach the term of their striving, their final end, which is also at the same time their first principle.

<sup>1</sup> Omnes homines natura scire desiderant.—Met., L. I, l. I.

The final end of man, union with which constitutes perfect happiness, and hence ultimate human perfection, is an intellectual being. Therefore the natural movement towards final perfection must show itself in the mind's gravitation towards perfect knowledge. What does all this subtle analysis of an obvious phenomenon point to, but the fact that nature, which in one sense has given, in another sense declares man's thirst for adequate knowledge of things, has at the same time placed an insurmountable barrier to his reaching in this life the object of his longing; for in his present state not one thing can he know perfectly, since even of the more proximate causes of things he has properly no perfect intuition, but only imperfect, abstractive perception, whilst of the final cause his media of knowledge can offer him but a faintly drawn sketch, an image of an object seen through a glass darkly. Philosophy, therefore, like any other science, can be but tasted on earth. Its full possession must be the soul's dowry when wedded to its Beginning and End; and knowing Him, the Ultimate Cause and Reason of all reality, as He is, it shall through Him see all things as they are. In lumine ejus videbimus lumen.

Still, we face the fact of the inborn craving for the knowing of things through their causes, even through their radical causes, and like every other native striving it can reach its mode of completion in the present order. This attainable intellectual endowment, representative of the most general groupings of all things reduced to their ultimate reasons, principles, or causes, and by these explained, is what men call philosophy. A vast thing this and high. Vast, because it embraces the Universe of Being—Real, Mental, Moral. High, because it ascends to the Supreme Cause and takes His view of Himself and His outer workings. High, too, because, as far as mere natural power can go, it is the temporal substitute of the eternal vision. Surely, so lofty and far-reaching a fabric must rest on broad and deep-lying foundations. When and what are the grounds of philosophy?



not the first stones in the building itself, but the plane on which the mental structure must rest? In a word, what are the pre-suppositions of philosophy—the facts and principles, if such there be, which must be accepted before we can begin to philosophize?

Logicians distinguish two methods of reaching ultimate truth:—the *a priori*, deductive, synthetic; and the *a posteriori*, inductive, analytic. The former way starts from the cause and leads to the effect; from the general to the particular; from the compound to the simple. The latter method reverses the way just described. Though philosophy is classed amongst *a priori* sciences, because in expounding it men adopt chiefly the deductive method, yet in the order of investigation we may start inductively, and having reached radical principles, which the mind will then see to be in themselves really *a priori* and implicit in the whole inductive process, we may from these principles deduce the body of conclusions which constitute properly the *science of philosophy*. So, too, in quest of the truths underlying the germinal principles, we might start inductively. The complex web of our cognitions is spread out before us. We might strive to disentangle it, separate inferences from principles, and work our way to the presuppositions of the latter. But the process would be long and unsafe, though it might satisfy the ambition of a novel system builder. Besides, the whole work has been done long ago by patient thinkers, and we shall save valuable time and labor by accepting their results—accepting them not on authority, but on the intrinsic grounds which commended them to sound reason.

## II.

The search for the Ultima Thule of philosophy began, as far as we can find, in the twilight history of human thought, and like the seeking for the North Pole nowadays, the end is not yet, at least outside of Catholic schools. To record the results would require many a volume. *Scepticism* absolute

and hypothetical, universal and partial; and Dogmatism,<sup>1</sup> more or less extended, mark the character of the general outcome of the efforts. Scepticism absolute and universal reaches the conclusion that there is no beginning, nor middle, nor end of philosophy—that philosophy is a figment,—because we can know nothing. The monstrosity of this theory, whose child destroys its parent, is evident. Partial scepticism is hydra-headed, especially in modern times. One form will allow us to start with sensation and to end with the sensible, all beyond rejected. Another will start with an idea and stop at the ideal. Another begins with feeling, another with instinct, another with faith, and so on. The radical principles of partial scepticism make directly towards universal doubt. For, if we must doubt the capacity of one human faculty, e. g., sense or intellect, to reach truth in its domain, or if in one order we are unable to discern true from false evidence (these are the principles of partial scepticism), we have no means of reaching a criterion for distinguishing certain truths in any order, and must needs strive to accommodate ourselves to the impossibilities of nescience. In favor, however, of hypothetical scepticism in its better guise, as *methodical doubt*, something can be said, though not, indeed, as to the form in which it is often attributed to Descartes as to its parent. What method of doubt Descartes really followed, is by no means certain. This is evident from the many divergent views honest critics take of his system.<sup>2</sup> His meditations seem to point to his starting from absolute doubt, at least as to speculative and naturally acquirable truth. Practical and revealed truths

<sup>1</sup> An offensive meaning frequently runs with this word. In philosophy it expresses the contrary of scepticism, viz., that system which maintains the possibility and fact of certitude in the human mind.

<sup>2</sup> Some regard the Cartesian method as the chief cause of the revolution in modern science, others brand it as an absurdity because it extends doubt to the veracity of reason as well as to all rational facts and principles, and hence becomes self-destructive. So Ubaghs and Zigliara. Others judge *it in itself*, apart from its *particular applications*, as justifiable. Thus Balmes and Kleutgen. See an excellent critique of the whole subject and its correlations in Schmid, *Erkenntnislehre*, vol. I., p. 101.



he appears certainly to have exempted from doubt. When pressed, however, by adversaries with the contradictions of his starting point, his answers point to doubt simply for the sake of method, i. e., to mental suspension until he had weighed the arguments for and against assent. If the latter interpretation be the true one, and such it would seem to be for weighty intrinsic and extrinsic reasons, his method in itself, when at least differently limited, is commendable. Descartes certainly inconsistently restricted his method of doubt overmuch on one extreme, and extended it beyond all warrant on the other. If it be possible to doubt of all so-called truths in the speculative order, like possibility runs equally well in the practical; for the practical order differs from the speculative merely in its connoting the motive power of will. It is, however, quite impossible even *methodi causa* to doubt of all speculative truths. The mind cannot work itself into utter suspense regarding, e. g., the first principle; otherwise, even in its assent to the consciousness of its own doubt and existence, the possibility of no doubt and no existence would oppose it. Not after wiping out all our cognitions, and standing mentally blind, save in regard to existing doubt and self, do we take our first step in the realities of knowledge; but in the very assertion of our doubting self we have at least implicit vision of a principle which is metaphysically and logically prior both to ourselves and assertion, and consequently only by implication of such principle have we any basis for assenting to the existence of our doubt and self. Descartes' famous primary, however,—*cogito, ergo sum*—when adequately analyzed, points to the real groundwork of philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Philosophy cannot rest on doubt. It must therefore rest on certainty; we say "therefore," because, although between doubt and certitude we distinguish the mental state *opinion*, with its objective motive *probability*, still probability cannot give an ultimate basis, for probability presupposes certainty. Whoso admits that he is in doubt or opinion, is certain in advance as to what is doubtful or probable, and that his mental state of doubt or opinion differs from that of certitude. He is certain, moreover, of the existence of the motive of his opinion and of its mental apprehension.

## III.

Modern scholastic philosophers are wont to single out three truths which they hold to be absolutely primary, each in its own order, and so to constitute the presuppositions of all science the plane above which the philosophic fabric must rise, if it can rise at all. These three are: 1. the *first fact*: the existence of the thinking subject; 2. the *first principle*: the principle of contradiction; 3. the *first condition*: the mind's capability of reaching certain truth. The *first fact* is primary in the *subjective* order. The *first principle* is primary in the *objective* order. The *first condition* is primary in the *logical* order, i. e., in the mental connecting of object with subject. That these truths are absolutely primary is evident from the fact that the mind can make no statement without implying them. If I say—"I think, therefore I am," I *explicitly* perceive my own existence, though indirectly, or *per accidens*, as the subject of my thought. I *implicitly* perceive the impossibility of my simultaneous non-existence; and *implicitly*, too, that I know that I exist. The reason of the inclusion of the three primaries in every mental assertion lies in the nature of the judicial act, which not only pronounces on the relation of a predicate with its subject, but, being a conscious act, announces at least implicitly, in *actu exercito*, non in *actu signato*,—as the school phrase goes—the conscious apprehension of such relation. For instance, if I say "God exists," and I *perceive* the *motive* for my attributing the predicate to the subject, my judgment, though actually one, is virtually twofold, viz., "God exists," and "I am certain that God exists." What we have said of the subjective judgment, "I think, therefore I exist," applies equally well to the objective, only that, whilst the former pronounces *explicitly* the *first fact*, and the other two primaries only *implicitly*, the latter contains *implicitly* all three primaries.

Now, that these three truths are really the necessary pre-



suppositions, the underlying ground, not, of course, the *fontal principle*, of all certain knowledge, follows: 1. From the fact that to deny or doubt them would be to render all certitude impossible; for the negating or doubting act would imply the perception of their opposites, which would mean absolute, universal scepticism with all its monstrous contradictions. 2. From the fact that their admission includes the possibility of certitude in relation to any evident object; for certitude simply requires: (a) the perception of any object; (b) of which object as logical subject a predicate is affirmed or denied; (c) because of some objective motive perceived. Now it is plain that these conditions are verified regarding any evident object when the three primaries are admitted. Therefore their admission involves the possibility of certitude.

Moreover (a) there can be no thought without a thinker, hence no certain thought without the certain preperception (at least implicit) of the thinker's existence; (b) certitude involves the perception of the possibility of the opposite of that to which the mind firmly adheres; therefore it involves the perception of the principle of contradiction; (c) whilst the possibility of certitude surely includes mental aptitude for reaching certain truth.

Again, the radical character of these primaries is equally evident from their necessarily anteceding all demonstration. How, for instance, prove one's own existence? The premises should needs be the affirmation of some conscious affection. e. g., thought or volition, and so would have to take the form "I think, I will," to *conclude* from which "Therefore I am" would be the most flagrant sophism. The principle of contradiction,<sup>1</sup> too, permeates all proof, expressing as it

<sup>1</sup> It may be objected that Aristotle proves that the same thing cannot at once be and not be, from the fact that the same attribute cannot be affirmed and denied. We answer, that the principle of contradiction may be expressed in its logical or metaphysical form, and the former inferred from the latter, and vice versa. In *reality*, however, the two forms are identical. Aristotle expressly denies the *demonstrability* of the principle. Ueberweg contends for its demonstrability by means of

does the basis of necessity in premise, sequence, and conclusion, whilst the *first condition* is essentially presupposed to any attempt at demonstration.

This preventing the possibility of proof is no imperfection in the *three primaries*; on the contrary, it is the mark of their high dignity. They shine by no borrowed light. They flash their natural splendor on the mind and compel its immediate act of vision. Themselves light, no other light is needed to illumine them.<sup>1</sup>

We have called the "first condition" the *mind's* aptitude for acquiring *certain truth*. Essentially connected with this primary is the *per se infallibility* of every cognoscitive faculty taken *singly*. Were every such faculty not thus natively

the concepts of *truth*, *judgment*, *affirmation*, and *negation*, and in fact states his proof thus: "The truth of affirmation is the same as the agreement of the mental representation with the real object, and is therefore identical with the falsity of negation. On the other hand, the truth of negation is the same as the disagreement of the mental representation with the real object, and is therefore identical with the falsity of affirmation. Consequently, if an affirmation be true, its negation must be false; and vice versa, Q. E. D." This is, however, plainly no demonstration, but a mere logical expression of the metaphysical principle. If an objector denied the metaphysical form of the principle, his suicidal position might be brought to his consciousness more vividly by placing it before him in its logical dress. Contingit quidem prædictum principium demonstrare argumentative (redarguitive, elenchice) solum si ille qui ex aliqua dubitatione *negat* illud principium, aliquid *dicit*, i. e., nomine significat?—Pesch, *Inst. Log.*, n. 591.

<sup>1</sup> We cannot prove everything, for this would imply an infinite chain of proofs every link of which would hang on nothing, that is, be incapable of proof. We cannot prove everything by mediate evidence, but we can show that we are justified in assuming certain things. We cannot prove that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, but we can show that we are justified in saying so. We can do so by the application of certain tests." McCosh, *Realistic Philos.*, p. 34.—First of these tests is *objective evidence*.

The certainty which is prior to all examination is not blind; on the contrary, it springs either from the clearness of the intellectual vision or from an instinct conformable to reason; it is not opposed to reason, but is its basis. Our mind, in discursive reasoning, knows truth by the connection of propositions, or by the light which is reflected from one truth upon another. In primitive certainty the vision is by direct light, and does not need reflection. Balme, *Fund. Philos.*, ch. 2.—The first three chapters of this work give a most lucid exposition of primitive certitude.



endowed, that is, if any faculty of knowledge, regarded *intrinsically*, in its very *nature*, could tend towards error, then farewell to all certitude. To the outer darkness of absolute scepticism we should be inevitably doomed. Nature is invariably the same, and so the hypothesis would mean for us unvarying error. Fortunately, however, the supposition is self-destructive. A cognitive faculty gravitating towards error is a contradiction. It would mean cognition of nothing, no cognition, no cognizing power; and since our faculties of knowing are all interrelated, *spontaneity* to go wrong on the part of one would draw all its fellow-workers, and hence the individual person and the whole human race, into the absurdities of utter nescience. See how we owe our logical salvation to the principle of contradiction!

*Essential infallibility*, however, is all we can attribute to our instruments of knowledge. In their present state they are all more or less subject to *accidental fallibility*. In their action they are immediately or mediately dependent on external conditions, a lack in which will entail deficiency in their working, and consequently of conformity between their inner act and the real condition of the outer thing. Nay, more, if we take man with his full set of faculties, we must call him *fallibilis per se*. We need not look outside of him for causes inducing toward error. Internal causes, the positive and negative influence of *will* inherent in him, are adequate enough for the baneful effect.<sup>1</sup>

It seems at first sight a hazardous thing to separate from the

<sup>1</sup> *Fallibilem per accidens* eum dicimus, qui propter causam suæ naturæ externam errare potest; *infallibilis ex toto* dicitur, qui nullo modo errare potest. Jam vero si homo spectetur pro toto complexu facultatum suarum dici potest et debet *fallibilis per se*; in eo enim complexu facultatum reperitur id quo homo in errorem ferri potest citra aliam causam homini externam. Si autem attendatur sola cognoscendi facultas, hanc negamus esse *per se* fallibilem. Quod quidem directe demonstrari non potest; supponendum enim esset id quod in quæstionem est tractum. Potest tamen declarari argumento indirecto (Pesch, *ibid.*, n. 595). Nevertheless error in regard to all things is intrinsically repugnant. For a cognitive power is necessitated to apprehend an *evident* object. And all things cannot be inevident.

widespread and apparently interminably interwoven tissue of human thoughts a certain few and to designate them radical. We feel the appositeness of Mr. Spencer's remark in this respect. He opens his chapter on the Data of Philosophy<sup>1</sup> thus: "Every thought involves a whole system of thoughts, and ceases to exist if severed from its various correlatives. As we cannot isolate a single organ of a living body, and deal with it as though it had a life independent of the rest, so from the organized structure of our cognitions, we cannot cut out one, and proceed as though it had survived the separation. . . . Overlooking this all-important truth, however, speculators have habitually set out with some professedly simple datum or data, have supposed themselves to assume nothing beyond this datum or these data; and have thereupon proceeded to prove or disprove propositions which were by implication already unconsciously asserted along with that which was consciously asserted." In view of this close interlacing of all our thoughts, and the difficulty of severing any definite ones as absolutely radical, some recent scholastic philosophers admit other primaries. It is sufficient, they hold, that the above-mentioned truths "are primaries, and further, that among primaries they deserve a special prominence to be given to them, because of their importance. But in addition to them, the principle of identity is primary; so is the principle of sufficient reason, that nothing can be without an adequate account for its existence; and so is the principle of evidence, that what is evident must be accepted as true. To compile a catalogue of all the truths which are self-evident, and cannot be reduced to components simpler than themselves, would be a tedious work. . . . If, however, we are called upon to emphasize any beyond the three mentioned primaries, it will be the principle of sufficient reason."<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, whilst it is undoubtedly true that the number of self-evident truths

<sup>1</sup> First Principles, p. II., c. ii.

<sup>2</sup> *First Principles of Knowledge*, John Rickaby, S. J., p. 174.



is beyond easy count, still we think Occam's razor should be applied mercilessly to the *absolutely* radical. Amongst the BEINGS which are not to be multiplied without necessity, *first truths* should hold front rank. The principle of *identity* differs not really from that of *contradiction*. The principle, too, of *sufficient reason* is reducible to the same basis. The same may be said of any other immediate truth.<sup>1</sup>

Fr. Lahousse is in favor of restricting the primaries to *two*. The *first condition* he thinks susceptible of proof. Either, he argues, we must admit the mind's capability (of acquiring certain truth) *blindly* or on *demonstration*. To admit it *blindly* is to contradict the very conception of an intellectual act—which act is essentially *vision*. Hence we accept it on *demonstration*, i. e.—*a posteriori*. The act, the effect, of the faculty is the medium of the proof; for it is only in the *act* of thought that we can gain cognizance of the existence and consequently of the capability of our mind.<sup>2</sup> We do not think this sufficient reason for dethroning the *first condition* from its place of honor. We do not first apprehend our mental acts or states in the abstract, and thence move on to knowledge of our mind and its aptitude for truth, but in the one conscious act we perceive ourselves perceiving, and consequently capable of certain cognition.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "*Dices*: Præter principium contradictionis requiritur etiam ut cognoscatur in omni iudicio certo saltem implicite principium causalitatis vel rationis necessariae sive sufficientis. Secus enim ex effectu qui est mea cognitio, concludere non possum ad causam qua est res cognita. *Resp.*: Negandum est cognitionem per se in ejus generis 'conclusionem' resolvendam esse. Ceterum principia rationis omnia ad principium contradictionis reduci possunt" (Pesch., *ibid.*)

<sup>2</sup> *Prælectiones Logicae*, p. 163.

<sup>3</sup> Quamvis meipsum intervenientibus affectionibus meis cognoscam, tamen non primo affectiones has in abstracto cognosco, ex quibus cognitio ad cognitionem meipsius progrediar, sed statim ab initio meipsum sic affectum cognosco, sive meipsum in affectionibus mecum quasi concretis, et deinde per abstractionem affectiones ut formas quasi a subjecto distinguimus, quum dico: "Ego sum cogitans" (Pesch, *Inst. Log.*, n. 591). The same holds good in regard to our perception of the *first condition* in every mental act. Lest, however, it should seem that the *first condition alone* is sufficient basis for after certitude, Fr. Pesch is careful to note "opor-

## IV.

From what has thus far been said it seems plain that philosophy may start with the facts of consciousness. Sifting these facts, the philosopher finds within himself a ceaseless, invincible tendency to know—to know himself and his environment. Contact with his fellow-men produces within him other facts of consciousness representative of the fact that the same craving for knowledge exists in the consciousness of all men.<sup>1</sup> He is conscious, moreover, that prior to any philosophical reflection he gives assent constantly, uniformly, to certain facts and principles; and experiences within himself no radical, spontaneous tendency to call such in question; on the contrary, he feels their controlling influence on his mind, which influence reflection on his inner experience shows immediately to be the absolute objective necessity of the facts and principles presented to him. Again communication with his fellow men shows him that they, too, have essentially like states of consciousness. Reflecting further on this universal fact, he can find adequate explanation of it only in an equally universal, constant, uniform reason or cause. This he sees cannot be education, prejudice, or some such partial motive, but solely the peculiar make-up of human nature when brought in immediate relation to objective truth. If he chance to read such speculative works as Mill's *Examination*, or Herbert Spencer's *First Principles*, he will at first be shocked at their efforts to cast suspicion upon his primitive cognitions; but weighing the arguments of these writers in favor of their tentative scepticism, he finds them futile and quite contradictory. When, too, he seeks the reason of their scepticism, he finds it at bottom to be the difficulty of throwing the

tere ut *etiam* aliquo modo percipiatur is *cui* veritas manifestetur, percipiaturque *etiam* rem ita esse, sicut percipiatur, et aliter esse non posse" (Ibid., n. 594).

<sup>1</sup> A separate treatise would of course be necessary to show adequately how this takes place, and the logical value of this new state of consciousness. We are justified, however, in introducing it here as a licit inference from what we have said regarding the *primary condition* and its *essential implications*.



bridge from mind to object. But a difficulty of explanation he sees to be no reason for denying or doubting a fact. Moreover, he finds that the advocates of primitive doubt are very few; that they pose as such only when they have donned their philosopher's robes; that in all practical life they accept first truths with the same firm grasp as do other rational beings. If, therefore, the arguments of sceptics move him in the least, he resigns himself to the fact that, if there be danger of erring either in accepting or doubting what clamors for his assent, and whose rejection forces him to do violence to his conscious radical tendency, then it were at least safer to cast his lot with the sum total of humanity rather than with a handful of its oddities.

Thus far our philosopher has not critically tested the value of this primitive natural assent to what he calls first truths. Can it claim the prerogatives of genuine certitude, and how does it differ, if differ it does, from strictly philosophical certitude. Examining the attributes of certitude, he finds them to be chiefly two: 1. firm mental adhesion to an object; 2. based on a motive *really objective*. Now, 1. his assent to primitive truths he is conscious to be unshaken and unshakable. The cavils of sceptics may at first surprise him, but when consciously at proper balance, he swerves not the least from his first position. This, again, he finds to be the mental state of practically the human race relative to the same truths. 2. In his own case as well as in that of other men, he perceives that the final motive of assent is the objective evidence of the truth presented to the mind. The mind in perception is conscious that the objective truth cannot be otherwise than it is, and so is necessitated to assent. All the objective motives need not be apprehended, nor all the relations of the truth presented: not even one motive must be *distinctly* perceived. The *clear* cognition of *one* objective motive in the object's presentation, showing the object's necessity, suffices. Now, in the presentation of primitive truths, this necessity is clearly presented to the mind, antecedent to all philosophical re-

flection. Therefore his mental state may be designated as certain. Natural certitude, whilst agreeing in kind with philosophical, differs therefrom *in degree*. Though in both mental states there is firm assent motivated by objective evidence, there is difference in the cognition of that motive. The child and the untutored man, in their assent to immediate truths, indirectly, implicitly—in *actu exercito*—perceive their motive of adhesion; whilst the philosopher draws out of his cognitive act its motive or motives, and views these directly and explicitly. Greater distinctness, therefore, in the perception of the motive of his assent, or a larger possession of motives, causes the philosopher's certitude relative to first truths to rise in *degree* above that of his less reflecting fellow-men.

Thus we see how the beginnings of philosophy are in perfect accord with common sense. She warps not human nature, but taking it as she finds it, she analyzes it methodically, draws out its best energies, and thus endowing it with its highest mental perfection, equips it for its temporal life work, and so prepares it, if will but follow her leading, for its unending vision of all things in their ultimate cause.

F. P. SIEGFRIED.

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## THE SCRIPTURE LESSONS OF THE BREVIARY.

(*The Winter Season.*)

THE Nocturns are part of the morning office (matins) in the Breviary. They are called *Nocturns* or night-watches, because they are intended to be recited before the dawn of day and before the celebration of Mass. Some offices, such as those of the ferial days and the Octaves of Easter and Pentecost, have but one nocturn; but ordinarily there are three, each of which consists of three distinct lessons with corresponding psalms, responses, and prayers.



If we examine the disposition of these nocturns in detail, they reveal a wonderful system of thought, a perfect code of law whereby to regulate our daily lives. The entire office is indeed nothing else than a manual of instructions for the training of the soul, and contains suggestions for the teacher, the preacher, the man of action and of affairs, the guardian and consoler of the poor, the sick, and the troubled in spirit. Whilst it is a professional guide-book for the priest, it is also a prayer-book, a Manresa for meditation, a legend of saints, and a text-book of theology, ascetical, Scriptural, and practical, wherein we find explained the mysteries of faith, the meaning of the sacred writings for our own edification, and of the Gospels for the instruction of the faithful.

As the hour of matins embodies and explains the leading thought in the daily office of the Church, so the lessons of the first nocturn present the foundation upon which that thought develops. Hence these lessons are taken from the S. Scriptures. They are the infallible word of God, selected to be expressive of and in harmony with the season or festival which the Church celebrates in her annual cycle, representing the life of Christ and the economy of salvation. These Scriptural readings are so divided that a cleric, by reciting his daily office, will in the course of a year have read the entire body<sup>1</sup> of the S. Scriptures. Some portions are passed over, but these are the so called supplementary books of Holy Writ. Their substance is contained in other parts of the S. Scriptures, and their purpose appears to be simply to confirm the authenticity of the facts recorded in the inspired volumes.<sup>2</sup>

The ecclesiastical year opens with the first Sunday of Advent. From that time to the eve of Christmas the Messianic

<sup>1</sup> Owing to the disposition of the ecclesiastical seasons, it sometimes happens that only the beginnings of certain books can be read.

<sup>2</sup> Such are the three last books of the Pentateuch, likewise Josue, Judges, Ruth, Paralipomenon (which means "Supplementary"), Esdras, and Nehemias. The Book of Canticles makes up a large part of the office of the Bl. Virgin on her different feasts throughout the year.

prophecies of Isaias are read every day in preparation for the coming of the Saviour. The Book of Isaias is not only the most emphatic and clear but the most charmingly expressed prediction of Christ's coming.<sup>1</sup> The writer may be called by excellence the Prophet of the Incarnation. His very name, Isaias, signifying "The Salvation of God," is indicative of his high mission as the forerunner of the Evangelist historians. In the Old Law he holds the place of first among the great prophets.<sup>2</sup> He is mentioned by the sacred writers who follow him, sometimes as the high-priest and the king of the prophets, sometimes as "the Prophet of divine mercy." From his youth he had been marked as having the seal of prophecy upon him, and his burning words, falling from lips anointed with the balm of the promised salvation, thrilled the inhabitants of Jerusalem and Juda for more than half a century, until the angry pride of those who had set their hearts on earthly hopes dragged away the old man of eighty, and severed limb from limb, so that even in his martyrdom he might foretell of the great bloody sacrifice near the walls of Sion.

The Book of Isaias consists of two main parts, with a suitable introduction, in which the Prophet puts forth, as it were, his credentials and announces his subject. This introduction, which covers six chapters of the sixty-six comprised in the entire book, is read in the office of the first week. On

<sup>1</sup> "Magnum et admirabilem aut divinum" immo "maximum et divinisimum" prophetam eum appellarunt Eusebius et Theodoretus; "magniloquentissimum" S. Gregorius Naz. et Chrysostomus; SS. Cyrillus, A. Hieronymus, Augustinus eum evangelistam et apostolum potius, quam prophetam, appellandum dixerunt, quia evangelicæ prædicationis splendore vaticinia sua exornasset. Similibus laudibus eum celebrarunt juniores interpretes omnes, inter quos aliqui eum omnibus oratoribus et historicis et poetis fuisse graviolem, ornatiorlem, sublimiorlem jucundiorlem censent, ut si latine scripsisset, Latinorum, si græce, Græcorum omnium gloriam obscurasset (Cfr. *Sanct. in Is. Proem.* 13). Inter sacros scriptores, si oratoriam artem attendis, solus ei Apostolus Gentium comparari potest.—*Introd. in S. Libros Compend.*, Cornely, p. 380.

<sup>2</sup> The Talmudists have placed him after Jeremias and Ezechiel, but this is contrary to the practice of the Masoretic writers.



Saturday the incident of Achaz, the king, who receives a sign from God, the assurance that a virgin is to bring forth Emmanuel, i. e., "God with us," is related. The three next chapters (viii.-x.), in which the thought of this promise is developed, are passed over. The next day, the second Sunday of Advent, draws an outline of the character of this wonderful child, the promised Messiah. Upon Him are to rest the spirit of the Lord: the spirit of wisdom, of understanding, of counsel, of fortitude, of knowledge, of piety; and He shall fill the earth with the spirit of holy fear. He will not judge men by the measures of the world. He will look to the poor and the meek. Justice and peace shall be the marks of His presence.—Then follow in succession pictures of how the powers of darkness will rise against the elected nation of God. But Babylon is to perish, and all the Gentiles surrounding Juda shall be laid low; the calamities which befall the chosen people on every side are to cease, and a remnant at least will be saved and become the seed of a new and faithful generation. It is with a note of beautiful confidence that the third week of Advent is ushered in: "O Lord, Thou art my God—Thou hast been a strength to the poor, a strength to the needy in his distress!" And forthwith the seer breaks forth into a hymn of expectant joy. It sounds like the *Adeste fideles*: Open, ye gates—the old error has passed away—peace, peace, because we have hoped in Thee. My soul has desired Thee in the night; yea, and with my spirit within me early in the morning I will watch Thee. Awake and give praise, ye that dwell in the dust, for the dew is the dew of the light; for behold the Lord will come.

The lessons of the fourth Sunday of Advent terminate the first portion of the prophecy. This portion is mainly historical and shows the gradual development of the Messianic predictions as verified among the nations. The second part is rather an application of the facts hitherto foretold. With this thought, the blessing promised to the children of earth, the last week before Christmas is occupied. The deliverance

of Israel from exile merely foreshadows, as Isaias explains, the deliverance of man from the bondage of sin. The new era of freedom, which the coming of Emmanuel brings, is one of exceeding peace to men of good will, that is, for those who comply with the laws of justice and charity inculcated by the Gospel of the great King Christ, who is to rule all the nations. This idea the Prophet repeats in twenty-three distinct appeals, sometimes called sermons, because each is complete. From this portion only such parts are selected for the reading in the office as are of separate significance to the idea of the development of the Christian Church as the work of the Messias. The lessons of Isaias are concluded on the day which precedes the vigil of Christmas: "You shall see, and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall blossom like herbs—for behold, the Lord is coming!"<sup>1</sup>

It has already been said that this prophecy is one of the most magnificent among the inspired writings. In point of oratorical art none of the sacred writers reaches the same excellence, unless perhaps St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans. It might seem as if the Holy Ghost had especially selected these two men naturally as the fittest instruments, the one to clothe in graceful thought and expression the announcement which, like distant harmony, foretold the coming of the Prince of Peace; the other—to catch the echoes of the King's sweet voice just after He had risen to His heavenly Father, and enraptured by the charms of that music, to repeat the melody to every man and child on earth. If Isaias is the Prophet of Christmas, St. Paul is the Evangelist of the Epiphany.

We are not surprised, then, that in the reading of the Scripture lessons St. Paul follows immediately upon Isaias. The first nocturns from the Sunday within the Christmas Octave to the Sunday within the Octave of the Epiphany are made up of the Letter to the Romans. Then follow in succession the Epistles to the Corinthians Galatians, Ephesians,

<sup>1</sup> Is. lvi. 14.



Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, the two Epistles to Timothy, one to Titus, Philemon, and last the Epistles to the Hebrews, which ends the sixth week after Epiphany. Then Septuagesima opens with the reading of the Book of Genesis. The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans gives us the key to his character as well as to his mission and the rest of his writings. The Church of Rome was founded by St. Peter and had been organized for more than fifteen years before St. Paul wrote this letter. We know that the other apostles had each portioned out their special field of labor. What business, then, had St. Paul in Rome? Was not the address of a pastoral letter to the people over whom St. Peter presided, and a promise to come to them that he might "impart unto them some spiritual grace," an assumption and interference in jurisdiction? No. To understand the action of the Apostle of the Gentiles, we must recall the conditions of the great capital at the time.

When St. Peter first came to Rome, he found there a great number of Jews. He confined himself in preaching the Gospel mainly to these. St. Paul himself leads us to this conclusion when he says: "To me was committed the gospel of uncircumcision, as to Peter was that of the circumcision."<sup>1</sup>

The Church of Rome, thus principally composed of Jews, had existed for about nine years when the Emperor Claudius issued his edict of eviction of the Jews. As this embraced also the Christians who had become converts from Judaism, there remained in the city but a sprinkling of so-called proselytes, that is, Greeks who had first become converts to the Mosaic Law and afterwards embraced Christianity. Besides these there were, of course, some converted pagans of Roman or foreign birth. As these grew in numbers during the absence of the Jewish converts, the Church of Rome assumed a more œcumenical character, and when after the death of Claudius the Jews were permitted to return to the

<sup>1</sup> Galat. ii. 7.

Eternal City, they found themselves in a comparatively strange atmosphere. The result was a strongly marked division between the Christians who were converts from Judaism and those who had abjured paganism. The one claimed superiority of origin as belonging to the race whence the Messiah had sprung. The other appealed to their superior knowledge and social position, and taunted the Jews with having rejected the promise of the Messiah and thus proved themselves unworthy of the new evangel. To produce union among these parties, so as to do effectually the work of the Christian Church, was a work which required not only prudence and tact but a certain social position, which would disarm prejudice on both sides. Whilst St. Peter might effect much with the Jewish converts, he would be less capable of inspiring the pagans with anything but a personal esteem. He was too pronouncedly a Jew. He lacked that classic learning which at this time was still the pride of the Romans. But St. Paul was the man. Though a Jew by birth, and of the royal tribe of Benjamin, he was a Roman citizen by inheritance, a man of culture and of worldly experience. He had many friends at Rome, whom he had formerly met in his travels. Some of these, government officials and at one time residents in the Grecian and Asiatic colonies, were converts, and influential at the Roman court. All this gave him special prestige with both parties. Hence, though not of the twelve selected to the companionship of Our Lord, he is eminently the apostle, the evangelist, of the Gentiles.

The principal thought which pervades the entire Epistle to the Romans is the proof that the coming of Christ has brought salvation to all men; that it is a gospel essentially of universal peace and grace.

In point of form it is a perfect work of rhetorical composition. As if he were conscious that he is speaking to ears that had not yet forgotten the charms of Tullian eloquence, he adopts the method of the prince of orators. Having

introduced himself and stated his proposition with chaste simplicity, he turns gracefully aside to captivate the benevolence of his hearers. Men speak of you, he says, everywhere in praise. Thus he raises their self-respect and disposes them to accept his injunction to justify in all detail the lofty trust which is reposed in them. Next he takes up the *dogmatic* portion of his theme.

During the three days that intervene between the Sunday office after Christmas and the feast of the Circumcision inclusive, the Apostle successively exhibits man as he is under the law of nature, under the Law of Moses, and under that of Christ. He shows how, whilst man aspires to higher things, unaided reason cannot guide him, and how without special grace he gradually turns that aspiration into a worship of the senses. He draws similar arguments from the history of the Jews. Although they were the chosen people, and governed by a theocratic rule, the law of grace was only foreshadowed in them. They received the promise of a reign of perfect grace, to which fact all their prophets bore witness, implying that the Mosaic Law was insufficient to satisfy, and only indirectly intended to lead mankind to the realization of the end which a natural longing pointed out to them as their ultimate destiny. This end he shows to have been accomplished in the coming of Christ.

From the day after New Year to the eve of the Epiphany the lessons set forth the exceeding great graces of the New Dispensation. Christ as God reconciles us with our heavenly Father unto the adoption of that son-ship which we had lost in paradise (v. 12-21). We are no longer God's freedmen simply, as were the Jews, but we are his children (vi.-vii. 6).

Just here, on the feast of the Epiphany, the Church inserts one chapter (or rather the parts of several chapters which had been omitted before, joined into one to form the three lessons of the first nocturn) from the prophecy of Isaias. It is a gladsome *magnificat*, pouring forth exuberant joy and



gratitude, and affectionate desires that the light and the love of the new-born King might not be lost. "*Gaudens gaudebo in Domino; et exultabit anima mea in Deo meo, quia induit me vestimentis salutis—non quiescam donec egrediatur ut splendor justus ejus, et salvator ejus ut lampas accendatur.—Surge, illuminare Jerusalem: quia venit lumen tuum.—Omnes sitientes, venite ad aquas.*"

After this the lessons from St. Paul are again taken up. He reminds us that flesh and blood, or birth, give no claim to the title of salvation; that the mercies of God are the fruit of fidelity to His law. With the second day after the Epiphany the dogmatic portion of the address is concluded, and the moral or exhortatory part is taken up in the following nocturn. It begins with the admonition, "Brethren, by the mercy of Christ I beseech you that you make your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God, a reasonable offering. And be not conformed to this world." This thought is carried out to the end. The Apostle bids us guard the spirit rather than the outward form of the law. He inculcates, first in general, then in particular, the different Christian virtues: sincerity, mercy, patience, longanimity, all the domestic virtues which promote peace and charity. The conclusion of this letter contains the affectionate salutations which the apostle sends from Corinth through Phœbe to his friends and former associates individually, who are now at Rome.<sup>1</sup> For the Sunday following the Epiphany the opening of the First Epistle to the Corinthians is assigned, which letter is continued through the week. The Second Epistle to the Corinthians takes up the next week, so that on the third Sunday after the Epiphany the Epistle to the Galatians is begun, the other epistles covering each only one, two, or three days, except that to the Ephesians, which takes up four days, and the letter to the Hebrews, which fills the week just before Septuagesima.

<sup>1</sup> This portion is generally omitted, unless the Epiphany itself occur on a Sunday, in which case the Epistle to the Romans is ended on the following Saturday.

The letters to the Corinthians are of special importance, as they explain the dogmatic precepts of the Church in detail. The other letters bear their purpose upon their surface. They instruct in special lines of faith and discipline; they admonish, correct, and reprove with singular force and unction. Although the Book of Genesis is taken up after this, and its regular reading is carried into the Lenten and Spring season of the ecclesiastical year, we find selections from the letters of St. Paul supplying on special occasions the lessons of the first nocturn, as for example on the first Sunday of Lent, when the reading is taken from the Second Epistle of the Corinthians. But this is going beyond the limits of the present paper. Of the Book of Genesis we might speak likewise in treating of the Spring quarter of the office at another time. Our main purpose was to indicate the ingenious meaning which the Church exhibits in her disposition of the nocturns. This would be still more apparent if we could compare the parallel motives that underlie the triplet of lessons in the three nocturns of each successive office. These nocturnal lessons are eminently fitted to give food for reflection. Upon the word of God in the first nocturn we see built up the developed doctrine in the different mysteries of faith celebrated in her feasts and illustrated by the lives of her saints. This is the object of the second nocturn. In the third we have the leading motive suggested by both the preceding thoughts and couched in some Gospel precept or figure, which receives its interpretation from the hallowed writings of great and holy men representing the tradition of Catholic faith unbroken from the days of the apostles unto our own. Such is the substance of the lessons in the office of matins. To effect their purpose as real lessons, to exercise that influence and fulfil the designs which inspired the Church to make the Breviary a source of constant and best information, and withal of manifold graces—this, our daily ledger, must be read before the distractions of the day have weakened our

sensitiveness to grace and have dulled the edge of that supernatural intelligence which is given to the priest, but which the world may easily rob us of. The thoughtful reading of the office improves the intelligence, and if reverence is added to the thoughtfulness, it instils the gift of piety, which is useful unto all things.

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### THEOLOGICAL MINIMIZING AND ITS LATEST DEFENDER.

IN a volume of a little more than 300 pages, under the title "Les Critères Théologiques," Canon di Bartolo has given us a concise treatise de locis theologicis.<sup>1</sup> He speaks of "the Value of Reason in Catholicism," "The Teaching Church," "General Councils," "the Roman Pontiff," "Tradition," "Sacred Scripture," etc. Moreover, this learned rival of Melchior Cano has undertaken the difficult and delicate task of reducing the rules for the use of these theological criteria to a series of negative and positive propositions, adding "the proofs which sustain and explain them." In this way, Canon di Bartolo assures us, "the constitutive elements of the criteria of Catholic theology will be seen as they really are, *without any exaggeration or attenuation of the truth*" (p. 37). This is an excellent rule, as is every rule dictated by common sense. However, we think no one has ever yet written on theological subjects without declaring explicitly or implicitly that he was opposed to all exaggeration and attenuation of the truth. This declaration, therefore, has a familiar look. It will be found in express terms in the prefaces of many works on moral theology. All assure us that they will lead us through the difficulties of that vast science "*aurea illa via media.*" They profess

<sup>1</sup> We have in our hands the first edition of the original "I criteri theologici," Torino, 1888, and the French translation, "Les Critères Théologiques," Paris, 1889. We quote from the latter, because it is from the second Italian edition, revised and improved by the author.



that they hold in equal abhorrence the "exaggeration" of the rigorists and the "attenuation of the laxists." But when we hear this same declaration from Patuzzi, a thorough rigorist, and Caramuel, whom St. Alphonsus calls "princeps laxistarum," we begin to think that such maxims no more make impartial men than the habit makes the monk.

### I.

Now, what is to be understood by *exaggeration*? A theologian exaggerates when he gives the name of dogma, that is to say, revealed truth proposed as such by the Church to the faithful for their belief, to a doctrine which has not received this supreme sanction of the Church. He exaggerates when he enumerates among the "*res fidei simpliciter*" (revealed immediately by God) things which are only "*corollaria fidei* or *veritates theologicæ*" (deduced with certitude from revealed truth by human reason). He exaggerates when he places in the same rank those truths which, to use the language of dogma, form the "*substantia fidei*" (revelation) and those which are called "*res ad fidei integritatem pertinentes*" (truths which are connected with revelation as contained in it: "*veritates theologicæ causaliter*," and truths belonging to the domain of natural reason or history, but at the same time connected and interwoven with the substance or purpose of revelation: "*veritates theologicæ finaliter*;" e. g., the meaning of an expression, text, or testimony; a dogmatic fact). He exaggerates when he applies to a doctrine a theological censure graver than that applied by the Church, and when he takes it on himself to censure opinions which may be held without any want of respect to the authority of the Church. In all these cases a theologian so acting will not escape the reproach of ignorance or arrogance. In other words, when speaking of the submission due by the Catholic to the divine authority which speaks in the magisterium of the Church, the theologian should inquire before all what are the truths which must be believed "*fide divina*

et Catholica" (dogmas properly so called). Then he must distinguish between the truths which are held *fide immediate divina* (because they are revealed explicitly or implicitly), and those which are held *fide mediate divina* or *fide ecclesiastica* (i. e., which are not revealed, but which are connected with revealed truths, and on which the Church has pronounced a definitive and infallible judgment in virtue of the infallible authority of her magistracy as revealed by God). Finally, the Catholic theologian will not confound such an infallible decision of the Church with a doctrinal *precept*, which, though emanating from the supreme authority, being, for example, a decree of the Holy See, does not exact an act of faith, but only what theologians call the "assensus religiosus." For, on the one hand this precept comes, in the case supposed, from that authority which provides for the *security* of a doctrine—an authority to which the Catholic owes true obedience;—and, on the other hand, the Church does not exercise her power in all its intensity, i. e., by an infallible judgment.

Thus it is that no private theologian, no matter who he be, can make or widen the scope of the *lex credendi* in the Church. He himself belongs to the *ecclesia discens*, and he is neither the "*testis authenticus*" nor the "*judex authenticus*" of the faith. He has to content himself with understanding and making others understand this divine law imposed upon the reason, this divine light enlightening the reason; and this he must do only under the influence and authority of the visible organ of the Holy Ghost, knowing well that thus and only thus can he preserve to the "Queen of the sciences" the proper character of *sacra scientia*.

Exaggeration, however, is not the fault of Canon di Bartolo. The only exaggeration of which we might venture to accuse him is his exaggeration of attenuation, or of minimizing, in dealing with some of the theological rules of which we have spoken above. We have thought it well to lay down these rules openly and clearly first, as a statement

of our theological *credo*, and, secondly, to indicate the point of view from which we shall examine the book. *Amici cari, patti chiari.*

## II.

Canon di Bartolo promised in his preface to give us the theological criteria "without attenuation." Has he been faithful to that promise? We are compelled to say frankly, he has not. In more than one point he has "attenuated" Catholic doctrine, and, what is more, he enjoys that minimizing to his heart's content. He has developed it into a system which runs like a red streak through the whole book. Now, of this system we must confess that we believe it not at all in harmony with the spirit of the Church; we believe it is injurious to her authority, and we consider it opposed to that filial obedience due her from her children. Therefore do we think that this is a dangerous system, dangerous especially at this epoch, one of the chief characteristics of which is the denial or at least the attenuation of authority.

This, then, to our mind is the chief defect of the book, and it is to caution others against it that we write these lines. The bold opinions which the author advances have something attractive about them, and the considerateness he shows for what is commonly called the spirit of the time cannot but impress us favorably. But boldness can become rashness, and considerateness may become weakness, and every concession made to error implies a corresponding sacrifice of truth. Long ago St. Augustine said that the so-called "time-spirit" is like a river which often sweeps away the most eminent and most noble souls. The history of theology, especially during the last two centuries, and, in our own days, the history of a certain liberal school in France and Germany, show us many examples of learned men who started out with the very best intentions to reconcile the Church and the world according to their own peculiar ideas, but at last became themselves unable to keep aloof



from the dangerous errors which this spirit hides under the most specious forms. We shall no doubt be called extreme, reactionary, behind the times, and so on. It concerns us very little indeed, for we are in very good company.<sup>1</sup> Most certainly, reason has its rights, and Catholicism grants them their fullest extent and defends them in all their integrity: "Credere non possemus, nisi rationales animas haberemus." But even to the enlightened reason of the nineteenth century she is compelled to say that it has no right, and can have no right, as against the Supreme Truth and His infallible organ on earth. In what concerns the dominion of Faith, the Catholic will without fear and without compromise say to reason: Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther; and thus hinder what the Vatican Council so well calls "*eorum qui sunt fidei occupatio*," "*eorum qui sunt fidei perturbatio*." The first constitution of this same council speaks also of a condescension towards the modern spirit which may become dangerous. It says clearly that this spirit is the cause, "*ut plures etiam e catholicæ ecclesiæ filiis a via veræ pietatis aberrarent, in iisque diminutis paulatim veritatibus, sensus Catholicus attenuaretur*." Thus, the Council continues, the "*integritas et sinceritas fidei*" have been endangered. Therefore, it concludes, the theologian must adhere to the decisions of the Holy See, "*quoniam satis non est, hæreticam pravitatem devitare, nisi ii quoque errores diligenter fugiantur, qui ad illam plus minusve accedunt*." Of "attenuation" of this kind we speak now, and of attenuation of this kind we believe we must accuse our

<sup>1</sup> See the Allocution "*Jamdudum*," March 18, 1861; also Syllabus, prop. 80. In these documents the Pope replies to those who proclaim the reconciliation of the Church with so-called modern progress, liberalism etc. The Vatican Council repeats the recommendations made by Pius IX chiefly to Catholic theologians, urging them to *combat* whatever in the spirit of the time is anti-Christian, revolutionary, or opposed to the lawful authority of the Church. When pointing out the means to be employed—the arms to be used in this combat,—the Council does not say a word about a new theology, but follows faithfully the constitutions and decrees of the Holy See which reject and condemn the errors of our days.

author. Canon di Bartolo in his work gives proof of vast erudition; in fact, it overpowers the reader when once he has become fascinated by the new and original character of the criteria. La Rochefoucauld says in his *Maximes*, "La vérité n'a peut-être pas fait autant de bien dans le monde, que son apparence y a fait de mal." Convinced that there is a core of truth in this hyperbolical phrase, we have made a special examination of the argumentation employed by the author, and have taken the trouble to verify his references as far as time and opportunity would permit. We have found in more than one instance that the proofs given are in no way in accord with the thesis; that the references are often irrelevant, often inexact, and sometimes, we regret to say, unfaithful.

As we shall be compelled to compare some of the doctrines of Canon di Bartolo to the tenets of certain schools or certain theologians whose theology is oftentimes even more than suspected, we hope we shall not be accused of want of charity. The sincere, Catholic sentiments and the good intentions of Canon di Bartolo are above all suspicion. He would have good reason to blame us if we felt obliged to emphasize this fact explicitly. Judges more competent than we have said it elsewhere before us. The numerous letters of distinguished personages prefixed to the book prove this.<sup>1</sup> Here we treat only of the book and of the doctrines contained in it. The gravity of the questions to be discussed, the loyalty which we owe to truth, and which alone will render a discussion practically useful, and finally the justice due to the author, lay upon us the duty of saying exactly what are the views in the book which we believe faulty, and what are the dangers which we fear will result from them. Now,

<sup>1</sup> While perusing these letters the reader will no doubt remember that compliments are not always an argument for or an approbation of the contents of a book. Besides, certain of these letters contain reservations on certain points naturally not specified. Finally, those who give their approbation without any restriction refer specially to the first twenty criteria "On the value of Reason in Catholicism," which had been printed separately.

history above all things contains many warnings for theologians, and it is to recall these warnings that we refer to the errors of certain schools and their consequences. And if it should appear to us that some of our author's opinions so deflect from the *via media*, that our false friends or our enemies—both of them inexorable logicians and keen observers wherever the authority of the Church is at stake—may abuse them, in such a case the trend of our criticism is expressed exactly in the words of St. Augustine:—"Hoc qui sentit nonne cernis quam contra Apostolum [Ecclesiam] sentiat? Quod quidem non ipse sentis, sed hoc sequitur illa quæ sentis. Muta ergo antecedentia, si vis cavere sequentia."

### III.

Before entering on a detailed examination of Canon di Bartolo's Theological principles, let us give an example which will show the justice of our remarks. We take a question which is always interesting and always practical, namely, the Temporal Power of the Pope. To this question Canon di Bartolo gives a special proposition under the third criterion, "the Roman Pontiff teaching *ex Cathedra*." Do we learn there what Catholics are to believe concerning this matter? No. Just as the general plan of his book obliges him to indicate especially the matters on which the Church and Pope are not infallible, and which consequently, in the author's opinion, we are not bound to believe or admit, so likewise here he treats this delicate subject in a negative proposition (p. 112).

The positive doctrine on the question he gives in a single sentence in a foot-note, and this sentence is so vague that it does not cast much light on the principal subject. We are not concerned here with the historical aspect of the matter; it does not come within the purpose of "*Les Critères Théologiques*" to prove the legitimacy of the temporal power



or to explain the circumstances which may render it necessary. The author has to treat the subject solely from the standpoint of theology or dogma. In the face of the many and luminous declarations in which the Popes, and notably Pius IX and Leo XIII, have affirmed the necessity of the temporal power for the free and independent exercise of their apostolic authority, it should suffice us to find a clear and precise reply to the following questions:—Are these declarations of the Popes decisions or decrees of the Holy See to which Catholics are bound to give their *assensus religiosus*, that internal and external obedience which the sacred authority of the Head of the Church demands? Or do they exact more than this? that is, have the Popes in the allocutions and apostolic letters delivered a definitive and infallible judgment on this matter, and must Catholics respond to the infallible teacher by an act of faith—not indeed an act of divine and Catholic faith, which can be only given to *revealed dogma* proposed by the Church, but the act of mediately divine faith, with which we must accept the teaching of the Church when she pronounces definitively on doctrines or on facts *connected* with revealed truths? In other words, what is the meaning of the Syllabus where it declares that all Catholics *must firmly hold* (“omnes Catholici firmissime retinere debent”) what the Popes have taught “*proposita et asserta doctrina*” on the necessity of the temporal power in the documents cited explicitly by the Syllabus itself (prop. 75, 76)? The Popes have therefore proposed a “doctrinal teaching” to the Church on this point.—Let us now consult “*Les Critères Théologiques*” of the Italian theologian to find our obligations “without exaggeration and without attenuation.” Canon di Bartolo lays down the opinion, in the “NINTH NEGATIVE PROPOSITION: *The Roman Pontiffs are not infallible in asserting their right to the temporal dominion of the Pontifical States* (p. 112).

Considering the documents quoted above, this statement is certainly bold; but we might let that pass and say *transeat*,

adding, *tantum valet quantum probat*. Let us examine the proofs in which, as the preface promises us, "we shall find that rigid logic which governs the development of the faith itself" (p. 37).

Here, then, is the proof: "The temporal dominion is merely a fact on which God has manifested his will neither to the Prophets nor to the Apostles. Consequently it cannot be an object of the infallible magistracy." This is all; absolutely all the intrinsic theological proof given. Of the authorities alleged we shall speak soon. A foot-note refers us to another criterion, and this, in turn, refers us to others, from all of which we learn that "the Church and Pope are infallible only in doctrines *indissolubly* connected with revealed doctrines" (p. 96).

Now, what shall we admire more, the profound theology of the proposition, or the "severe logic" with which it has been developed? We must certainly render this testimony to Canon di Bartolo: "Les Critères Théologiques" are logical on one point at least—they follow closely and logically the lines of his peculiar theology so characteristic of the book—a theology which denies the infallibility of the Church and Pope *in the definition of dogmatic facts*.

We shall follow the author on this field step by step in our further explanations; here it will suffice to make the following remarks:—

1. The question of the object of the infallibility of the Church has become since the time of Jansenism the touchstone of Catholic theology.

2. To restrict the infallibility of the Church to revealed dogmas, or at least to truths which may become dogmas because they are contained in revelation or "indissolubly connected with revealed doctrine," formed the quintessence of the theology of Jansenism, Josephinism, Febronianism, and in our times Doellingerism.

3. To deny the infallibility of the Church or of the Pope when they pronounce a definitive judgment on doctrines or

on facts exclusively or principally connected with revelation, is to shake the very foundations of the infallibility of the Church. It would bring many of these definitions under the judgment of "theologians," or Catholics in general, who would first contest the *right* of their mother, in order to find some pretext for disobeying her. It would be, consequently, a grave danger, leading to the denial of the supreme rule of faith even in the domain of dogma, inasmuch as the theologian might discover that such a defined doctrine "was not revealed to the Prophets or to the Apostles." Every one knows that the Doellinger school came to heresy and apostasy by this very route.

4. That the Church and the Pope are infallible also in regard to doctrines not directly revealed, or to dogmatic facts, is now the common opinion of Catholic theologians, who declare that it cannot be denied without falling into a *grave error*, and consequently committing a grievous sin against faith.

We shall not cite here Franzelin, Mazzella, Zigliara, Palmieri, Scheeben, Hettinger, Hurter, Heinrich, etc. (all these authors are quoted with a certain fondness by Canon di Bartolo in other questions, though often irrelevantly), as we intend to return in detail to our author's doctrine on this point. We shall only add:—

5. Canon di Bartolo's argument *as it lies in the "proof" referred to above, destroys the infallibility of the Church in all that is not or cannot be a dogma properly so called*, at least, whenever she would pronounce upon a fact which has not been explicitly or implicitly revealed.

We see, then, where "the severe logic" of Canon di Bartolo would lead us, and what entirely false principles could be drawn from his book by those who would seek therein the true criteria of theology. We shall see below to what lengths he himself goes in applying his system of attenuation in this regard.



With reference to the particular question we are now treating, we would add:—

6. Certain Italian and Italianizing theologians, turning theology into “politics,” were fond, and still are, of the following style of argumentation:—If the Pope and all the bishops of a general council should decide that in the present circumstances the Sovereign Pontiff has need of the temporal power, we should not be obliged to submit—we would not be excommunicated even if they fulminated their most formal sentences of excommunication,—because they would not speak as doctors of the Church (“come maestri della Chiesa”), because their judgment would have for its object matters which have not been revealed (“il giudizio non verserebbe sopra materie rivelate”).<sup>1</sup>

This is Jansenism pure and simple—the distinction between the *right* and the *fact*. They pretend to admit the infallibility of the Church, but repudiate it as soon as she exercises it; and yet they boast themselves true Catholics—Catholics better and more enlightened than the Pope and the Episcopate.

We shall not discuss here whether or not the necessity of the temporal power be really defined in the documents given above. This question, to which we would here answer neither *yes* nor, much less, *no*, is of no importance in our present argument. We simply repeat that the reasoning

<sup>1</sup> Thus the “Mediatore,” “giornale politico, religioso, etc.” The acts of the Vatican Council refer at length to this journal. It was against its arguments that the theologians of the Council had drawn up a plan for a *conciliar definition* on the temporal power. See *Acta et Decreta C. Vat.* (Coll. Lac., § vii., p. 572, 619 ff.) The definition was placed in the schema de ecclesia c. xii., where it was also proposed to define the object of infallibility, c. ix. The “adnotationes,” after having explained the “Mediatore’s” theory, the substance of which is given above, add: Sed doctrinæ sunt istæ plane detestabiles, perversæ penitus ac perniciosæ, seditionis ac scandali plenæ, quasque piæ aures non ferunt” (p. 622). We know well enough that a plan for a definition is not a definition; but this scheme, elaborated by order of the Pope, approved by him and by the Episcopal Committee, submitted to the Bishops of a Council, surely furnishes us at least with a new proof of the *definability* of the doctrine in question.

quoted above destroys the infallibility of the Church. If the Church pronounces judgment definitely on any matter, she thereby declares by that very act that she is competent to define in such matter. "The first thing required," says Hettinger, with Franzelin, "nay, the essential supposition for the action of the Church's *magisterium*, is that this teaching authority cannot deceive itself when judging concerning the range of its power and the extent of its object." Her competency, then, is defined by the very fact of the definition; *in actu exercito*, as is said in the schools.

The Encyclical "Quanta Cura," Dec. 8, 1864, indicates clearly that the infallibility of the Church and of the Pope extend also to "things which bear on the general good of the Church" ("res ad bonum generale Ecclesiæ pertinentes"). Who can for an instant doubt that the full and entire freedom of the Head of the Church, his complete independence of every human power—which is a revealed truth—is not of interest "to the general good of the Church?" If the faithful are bound to believe *fide divina* the right and the necessity of this independence, who does not see how important it is to know the *means* which in certain circumstances constitute the principal and also the only way of assuring it. But in our days the circumstances, the relations between nations, for example, are such, that the Pope must necessarily be the subject of a secular prince if he is not a temporal sovereign himself. Therefore this temporal sovereignty is intimately connected with the full liberty which belongs to the Holy See by divine right. Hence it can well be an object of an infallible decision, even though it be a *fact*, because it has become and is a *dogmatic fact*.

Schiller, the German poet, complains in his *Xenien* that politics often shapes in its own fashion "Virtue, that unwelcome guest."<sup>1</sup> In Italy, as we have seen, it also lays hold on theology. Has this false and anti-Catholic patriotism

<sup>1</sup> "Aus der Æsthetik, wohin sie gehoert, verjagt man die Tugend;  
Jagt sie, den laestigen Gast, in die Politik hinein."

blinded Canon di Bartolo? We do not know, and it is not our business. We only see with regret that his book faithfully reproduces what is called in Italy "Il fondamento dottrinario dell' unità Italiana." Anyhow, we can thus easily understand another fact :—Canon di Bartolo, in this criterion of the infallibility of the Roman Pontiff, treats a special question. Now, the best and most authentic sources for this subject are the pontifical documents issued concerning it. But though the book all through abounds in such references, here on this point there is *not the slightest mention* of the views of the Holy See, which might be considered at least respectable authority on such a subject. But we have forgotten; there is a note, the one we mentioned above. It is neither fish nor flesh, as they say, and we understand its opportuneness better than its meaning. In it the author takes occasion to introduce the name of Pius IX. We transcribe the note in full :—

"It by no means follows (from the proposition) that the Roman Pontiff has not a divine right to the independence of his apostolic ministry, and also the right to exact, according to the times, all the extrinsic conditions indispensable for the free exercise of this ministry. See Conversation of Pius IX with Cesare Cantù, *Storia Universale*, edit. 10, disp. 84, 1886, p. 216, note 8." *Sapienti sat!*

Let us come to the extrinsic proofs given by Canon di Bartolo for his thesis, that is to say, to his quotations. He wishes to prove and must prove that the Popes are not infallible in asserting the right in question. To support his thesis he cites two passages from the *Civiltà Cattolica*; then he refers to the Bishops of America in the Seventh National Council of America, 1849,<sup>1</sup> and to a French author, Perreyve. *Now, not one of these authorities has a single word about the author's thesis!* All without exception merely state that the temporal dominion is not *absolutely* necessary for the *existence* of the Church and of the Papacy; that it does not belong

<sup>1</sup> Should be: Seventh Provincial Council of Baltimore.



to the *essence* of the one or the other ; but all affirm at the same time, and in the same places from which the author quotes, the moral necessity of the temporal power, i.e., its necessity in the present circumstances to guarantee the full independence of the Holy See. From the standpoint of "severe logic" this argument is a sophism which bears the not very flattering name of "*ignoratio elenchi*," and we have here the worst form of what logicians call "*simulata probatio*." The definition of it can be found in any elementary treatise of philosophy, and if it does not commend the "logic" of a book, it is still less commendatory of its sincerity. Canon Bartolo ought to know that the authors which he quotes do not view things as he does, and that they would protest against his manner of arguing. But we must now prove our assertion, or rather, we should say, our accusation.

The celebrated Jesuit Review "*La Civiltà Cattolica*" has the well-earned reputation of being one of the most remarkable Catholic periodicals in the whole world. The deepest questions of theology, the most subtle subjects in philosophy, the most interesting problems of natural science and of public and international law, the social interests of the various countries and of the whole world, are treated with a master hand. Moreover, the *Civiltà* has distinguished itself by its indefatigable zeal in defending the rights of the Holy See. Since 1870, following the example set by the Popes themselves, it has let pass no opportunity of proclaiming the necessity of the temporal power and of reminding the Catholics of the whole world in general, and the Catholics of Italy in particular, of their duties in this matter. We can therefore well understand how it is that Canon di Bartolo opens his series of citations with an appeal to the great organ of the Society of Jesus. Immediately after the argument given above, he continues: "The theologian of the *Civiltà Cattolica* has written the following: 'No one has ever dreamt that the temporal power is or could be the object of a dogmatic

definition, which is never issued except regarding revealed truths' (Jan. 15 1876); and the same theologian wrote still more explicitly, on the 19th of February, 1887: 'The temporal sovereignty does not enter into the essence of the papacy, which can exist without it, as it did in fact for a long time.'"

Bearing in mind always what Canon di Bartolo is bound to prove, namely, that the Church cannot deliver an infallible judgment on the question, let us hear now the witness which he cites to support it. The article in the *Civiltà* was written against a book of a certain Dr. Borroni, a layman who attempted in his turn "andar in sacristia," that is to say, who wished to pose as a deep theologian in order to attack the temporal power of the Pope. Dr. Borroni naturally professes the greatest love for the Church; he also loves the Pope; but more than these he loves the Prophets and Apostles. He believes in the infallibility of the Church, but he reserves to himself to control her teachings and to hold up against her, if necessary, the Prophets and Apostles... of United Italy! With an air of triumph he proclaims: "Never can Pope or Council raise to the dignity of a dogma the principle of the temporal power!"

The theologian of the *Civiltà Cattolica* first refers the Doctor to his catechism, tells him that his whole argument is beside the question ("fuor di proposito"), that there can be no question of dogma (See the phrase cited by Bartolo), and then he continues *immediately* after:—

*But the sincere Catholic does not limit his obedience to dogmas alone. He gives it to all the doctrines and teachings of the Church. This doctrine and teaching embraces, besides dogmas, many truths which are either dependent on dogmas, or connected with them by an interior or exterior bond.*

*Now the necessity of the temporal power of the Roman Pontiff at the present time, although, as we said, it is not and cannot be a dogma, is, however, contained in the doctrine and teaching of the Church, because it has been solemnly proclaimed by all the*

*Bishops of the Catholic World and by their Head, the Pope."*<sup>1</sup>

So Canon di Bartolo has had the hardihood to lay before his readers as a proof of his thesis a mutilated text from a writer who refutes that thesis explicitly, and who declares that the theology of it is unpardonable even in a layman who has studied his catechism.

And the climax of what we should be inclined to call, if the matter were not so serious, "this pleasantry," is that our author avails himself against us of a witness who frankly classes him among insincere Catholics. Frederick II. had good reason to say, "Give me three lines of any man's writing, and I will hang him on it." Truly,

Difficile est satyram non scribere ; nam quis. . .

Tam patiens. . . tam ferreus, ut teneat se !

After the remarks quoted above, the *Civiltà* relegates the Doctor to his place, by adding: "And here every man of good sense must feel indignant in presence of these doctors and lawyers, who believe they know more about the rights of the Church than the Bishops or the Pope. As if God had committed to them and not to the latter the care and the government of His Church."

The second reference of Canon di Bartolo is taken from an article in which the *Civiltà* refutes the famous Bonghi, former state-minister and occasionally a liberal theologian, as he loved to be called. There the theologian of the *Civiltà* develops the same ideas as in 1876, and attacks the same 'sophisms,' as he terms them. In a word, if we would make

<sup>1</sup> "Niuno ha sognato mai di dire che il poter temporale sia o possa essere oggetto di definizione dommatica, il che non compete che alle sole verità rivelate. Ma il sincero cattolico non restringe la sua obbedienza ai soli dommi ; bensì la presta a tutto ciò che è dottrina e insegnamento della Chiesa. La qual dottrina e il quale insegnamento abbracciano, oltre i dommi, moltissime verità che o dai dommi dipendono, o coi dommi si collegano per alcun vincolo interno od esterno. Or la necessità del poter temporale del romano Pontefice nei tempi presenti, benchè, come dicemmo, non sia nè possa esser domma, è contenuta nondimeno nella dottrina e nell' insegnamento della Chiesa ; per essere stata solennemente proclamata da tutti i Vescovi dell' orbe cattolico, con a capo, il romano Pontefice.



a collection of propositions—we say *propositions*, not *articles*—in which the Civiltà has formulated for the past twenty years the theses *diametrically opposed* to that laid down by Bartolo, this collection alone would fill a volume fully as large as “*Les Critères Théologiques*.”

And now a word on the “Thirty Bishops of America.” In 1849, Pius IX, driven from Rome by the Revolutionists, was in exile at Gaeta. Our pastors in Baltimore could not but offer a new and eminent proof of the filial and faithful attachment of Catholic America to the head of the Church. They did so in a pastoral letter, which was conceived in such noble and lofty terms that it was received and read on both sides of the Atlantic with heartfelt admiration. Perrone, (whence di Bartolo has taken it) gives it almost entire in his work “*Protestantism and the Rule of Faith*,” to prove the intimate union between the august Exile and our episcopate. Here are the words of our Catholic and Apostolic pastors:—“Although the Kingdom of Christ is not of this world, and the successor of Peter has of divine right no temporal dominion, yet through the munificence of Christian princes, and the spontaneous acts of a people redeemed from bondage by the paternal influence of the Bishop of Rome, a small principality has been attached, during more than a thousand years, to the Holy See, under the name of Patrimony of St. Peter.

“... Willingly would we persuade ourselves that the outrages committed against his authority are to be ascribed to the desperate machinations of a small number of abandoned men. . . . We must at the same time avow our conviction that the temporal principality of the Roman States has served, in the order of Divine Providence, for the free and unsuspecting<sup>1</sup> exercise of the spiritual functions of the pontificate, and for the advancement of the interests of religion, by fostering institutions of charity and learning. Were the Bishop of Rome the subject of a civil ruler, or the citizen of a republic, it

<sup>1</sup> Minimeque suspectam (Editor).

might be feared that he would not always enjoy that freedom of action which is necessary that his decrees and measures be respected by the faithful throughout the world."

Now, by what artifice does Canon di Bartolo make use of these words to support his thesis? He quotes only the first sentence of it;<sup>1</sup> then he adds: "No one could say, in more clear terms, that the temporal power is a *purely human fact*, on which, *consequently*, an infallible judgment cannot be given."

The reader will appreciate and form his judgment on this method of procedure. If by the equivocal expressions, "a purely human fact, *on which consequently*," Canon di Bartolo wished to insinuate that the pastoral letter is in harmony with his logic and his theology, we would protest most indignantly against such an aspersion on the memory of our Fathers in the Faith.

(*To be continued.*)

J. SCHROEDER.

## TITULARS IN FEBRUARY.

### I. ST. BRIGID.

Feb. 1, in Domin. Sexages. quæ tantum commemoratur. Feb. 3, fit de Octava, et Convers. S. Pauli transfertur in 14. Feb. Commem. Octavæ per reliquos dies Oct. et etiam in die Octava quæ occurrit in Dom. Quinquag.

*Pro Clero Romano*, ut in Calend. cum com. Oct. infr. Oct. et in Dom. Quinquag.

### II. PURIFICATION OF THE B. V. MARY.

Feb. 2, ut in Calend. Com. Oct. per omn. dies Oct. De hac fit 3. Feb. et in die Octava, unde fest. S. Cyril. permanent. mutand. in 14. Febr.

<sup>1</sup> He omits the last words, "under the name of *Patrimony* of St. Peter." For what reason?

*Pro Clero Romano*, idem, cum com. Oct. per dies Oct. et officio Octavæ in die octava, unde in primam diem liberam perpetuo movend. fest. S. Zosimi.

## III. ST. AGATHA.

Feb. 5, Comm. Oct. quotidie usque ad 10. Feb. inclus., quando terminat. Oct. propt. Quadrag. Fest. S. Philip. a Jesu celebr.  
12. Feb., *pro Clero Romano* 18. Feb.

## IV. ST. APOLLONIA.

Feb. 9, Octava partialis terminatur 10. Feb. ubi commemoratur. Fest. S. Cyrill. permanent. mutand. in prim. diem liberam; item *pro Clero Romano* fest. S. Zosimi.

## V. ST. SCHOLASTICA.

Feb. 10, sine octava propt. Quadrag.

## VI. ST. MATTHIAS.

Feb. 24, Idem.

## VII. ST. WALBURGA.

Feb. 25, Sine octava. Ulterius transfertur fest. Cathedræ S. Petri in diem sequentem, et *pro Clero Romano* fest. S. Felicis figend. 1. Mart., ubi de eo hoc anno fiet ut simplex.

H. GABRIELS.

## CONFERENCE.

**Adulteration of Beeswax.**

As the obligation of using only beeswax in the celebration of the Holy Sacrifice (and likewise in the administration of the sacraments) is being recognized everywhere in the United States, it will be timely to call attention to the fact that the wax-traffic in America has some features with which the clergy who are desirous of obtaining only the genuine material may not be generally familiar.

At present there is no dearth of pure beeswax in the United States. For a number of years we have exported



large quantities of it. Much of this export has presumably gone to supply the Catholic Church in Europe, since statistics show that the consumption of pure wax in Catholic countries exceeds that of other lands in the proportion of ten to one.<sup>1</sup>

The late Bishop of Alton, in order to refute the objection that sufficient wax could not be raised in this country to supply the Catholic Church for purposes of worship, took the trouble of computing, from Government statistics and information gathered at the various custom houses in the United States, the amount of wax readily available as a commercial commodity. The result of his calculation showed that the amount of wax which was exported in a single year from the States to foreign countries alone was sufficient to supply all the Churches for five years with unadulterated wax for lights, supposing that every priest celebrated Mass daily.

The wax which we obtain from American bee-culture is said to be fully equal in quality to the ordinary European wax. Its price is not above that of the foreign markets. Nevertheless the wax sold by our dealers as pure is often largely adulterated, in order to satisfy the demands of competition created by the current market prices. One form of adulteration is the admixture of starch in varying quantities. This may be detected by simply placing a piece of the supposed wax in oil of turpentine. The wax is at once dissolved, and the starch remains as a residue. The addition of stearine may be discovered by dissolving a portion of the candle in two parts of oil, adding acetate of lead, which produces a solid precipitation. Tallow may be secreted in a similar way.

Of course, a priest purchasing wax candles may not always care to undertake this sort of chemical analysis, simple as it is; there is, however, a means for discovering deception nearly as certain and in some cases more so. This is a price which is practically below that for which pure wax can be

<sup>1</sup> In Russia (Greek Schismatic Church) the proportion is four to one.

furnished. It is an error to estimate the value of wax candles upon a scale that suits lights made of other and cheaper material, such as sperm candles. If it were simply a question of lights, we should act prudently in keeping within a certain range of prices; but it is not a question of having lights but of getting pure wax for symbolical and mystical reasons. We cannot allow ourselves to be deceived into buying an article which the dealer styles wax, but which is in reality a mixture of various ingredients with probably less than one half or one third of the genuine material. If we ask for the best consistent wax, we can obtain it, no doubt; but we must expect to pay a suitable price, and economy in this case, if it exceed certain limits, would expose us to the danger of being duped. This we can hardly be willing to submit to, any more than to have cheap imitations of flour, or wine, or linen imposed upon us as the articles which we need for the altar service.

We sometimes hear of complaints of bad wax, which, though apparently pure, is either brittle, or too soft, so as to bend easily in moderately heated churches, or smokes, and is of an unpleasant odor. These evils are likewise incident to cheap wax. The good article requires considerable preparation by frequent heating and gradual bleaching. By lessening the expense of the labor, and making use of chemicals for the bleaching, especially with nitric acid, an inferior grade of wax is produced. There is also a kind of wax, very much like beeswax, produced from a certain vegetable substance indigenous in this country. It is commonly called myrtle-wax (*myrica cerifera*,) and is of a greenish yellow color.

There is, then, a positive danger of defeating our own intention if we look solely to the cheapness of the material offered for sale as wax. Bishop Ludden, having occasion to address a prominent dealer on the subject, writes: "It is positively certain that the candles commonly sold and in common use are not pure beeswax. Nay, there is no assurance that they contain less than twenty per cent of extraneous matter. . . .

Considering the price of the raw material, its shrinkage in bleaching and refining, the cost of manufacture, the legitimate profit to dealers, it is absurd to expect a genuine article for the price commonly charged."

### Tripe and Lard on Days of Abstinence.

*Qu.* Is it allowed to eat Tripe on Fridays or fastdays? I am informed by a French priest that Tripe is eaten on Fridays in France.

It is permitted, I think, to use pork grease in preparing clam-chowder. Could beans baked with pork be eaten on Friday, provided the meat be left aside? Pies, cakes, etc., are allowed on days of abstinence, although *Lard* is used in cooking them.

French people are in the habit of boiling quantities of meat, from which they make soup for Fridays, leaving the meat for following days.

Is this right?

*Resp.* *Tripe*, being the large stomach of ruminating animals, i. e., flesh meat, is forbidden by the law of abstinence.

In France *tripe* means something very different, namely, a plant (lichen) having a bitterish taste. Mixed with the roe of fishes, it is used as a favorite Friday-dish. The French gentleman had probably this in his mind. The plant is found in North America, and cold and rocky regions, and goes under the name of *tripe de roche*.

*Lard*, liquefied, is allowed instead of butter in the preparation of vegetable food, as also of bread, cake, etc. Neither the soup nor the beans above referred to seem to be allowable, unless poverty or other necessity dispense with the law of abstinence. Gury-Ballerini (vol. I., n. 486) considers that the use of food cooked "*cum magna carnis quantitate*" is a *peccatum grave*, although he adds: "*facilius autem excusantur a gravi vel etiam levi peccato pauperes, qui cum butyrum emere non valeant, exigua sagiminis quantitate ad condiendam offam utuntur.*"

It must be remembered as a fundamental principle, judging in given cases like the above, that the dispensations from the law of abstinence are always based on the sup-



position of a more or less stringent and universal necessity, and that they are not meant to abrogate the law.

The question of "wild ducks" as abstinence food is a lengthy one—historically; our American wild ducks appear to come under genuine flesh meat.

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## ANALECTA.

LITTERÆ CIRCULARES DE SERVITUTE AFRORUM ABOLENDA et de missionibus catholicis in Africa juvandis, ad omnes Episcopos totius Orbis Terrarum.

VENERABILIS FRATER,

SALUTEM ET APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

Catholicæ Ecclesiæ, quæ omnes homines materna caritate complectitur, nihil fere antiquius fuit inde ab initio, ceu nosti, Venerabilis Frater, quam ut servitutem, quæ misero iugo premebat mortalium quamplurimos, sublatam cerneret penitusque deletam. Sedula enim custos doctrinæ Conditoris sui, qui per se Ipse et Apostolorum voce docuerat homines fraternam necessitudinem quæ jungit universos, utpote eadem origine cretos, eodem pretio redemptos, ad eandem vocatos beatitatem æternam, suscepit neglectam servorum causam ac strenua vindex libertatis extitit, etsi, prout res et tempora ferebant, sensim rem gereret ac temperate. Scilicet id præstitit prudentia et consilio constanter postulans quod intendebat religionis, justitiæ et humanitatis nomine; quo facto de nationum prosperitate cultuque civili meruit optime.—Neque ætatis decursu hoc Ecclesiæ studium adserendi mancipia in libertatem elanguit; imo quo fructuosius erat in dies, eo flagrabat impensius. Quod certissima testantur monumenta Historiæ, quæ eo nomine plures commendavit posteritati Decessores Nostros, quos inter præstant S. Gregorius Magnus, Hadrianus I, Alexander III, Innocentius III, Gregorius IX, Pius II, Leo X, Paulus III, Urbanus VIII, Benedictus XIV, Pius VII, Gregorius XVI, qui omnem curam et operam contulere, ut servitutis institutio, ubi vigeat, excideret, et caveretur ne unde exsecta fuerat, ibi ejus germina reviviscerent.

Tantæ laudis hereditas a Prædecessoribus tradita repudiari a Nobis non poterat: quare nulla prætermissa a Nobis occasio est improbandi

palam dammandique tetricam hanc servitutis pestem ; ac data opera de ea re in litteris egimus, quas III Nonas Majas anno MDCCCXXXVIII ad Episcopos Brasilæ dedimus, quibus gratulati sumus de iis, quæ pro mancipiorum libertate in ea regione gesta fuerant laudabili exemplo privatim et publice, simulque ostendimus quantopere servitus religioni et humanæ dignitati adversetur. Equidem cum ea scriberemus, vehementer commovebamur eorum conditione qui dominio subduntur alieno ; at multo acerbius affecti sumus narratione ærurnarum, quibus conflictantur incolæ universi regionum quarundam Africæ interioris. Miserum sane et horrendum memoratu est, quod certis nunciis accepimus, fere quadringenta Afrorum millia, nullo ætatis ac sexus discrimine, quotannis abripi per vim e rusticis pagis, unde catenis vincti ac cæsi verberibus longo itinere trahuntur ad fora, ubi pecudum instar promercalium exhibentur ac veneunt.—Quæ cum testata essent ab iis qui viderunt, et a recentibus exploratoribus Africæ æquinoctialis confirmata, desiderio incensi sumus opitulandi pro viribus miseris illis, levandique eorum calamitatem. Propterea, nulla interjecta mora, dilecto Filio Nostro Cardinali Carolo Martiali Lavigerie, cuius perspecta Nobis est alacritas ac zelus Apostolicus, curam demandavimus obeundi præcipuas Europæ civitates, ut mercatus hujus turpissimi ignominiam ostenderet, et principum civiumque animos ad opem ferendam ærurnosæ genti inclinaret.—Quam ob rem gratiæ Nobis habendæ sunt Christo Domino, gentium omnium Redemptori amantissimo, qui pro benignitate sua passus non est curas Nostras in irritum cedere, sed voluit esse quasi semen feraci creditum humo, quod lætam segetem pollicetur. Namque et rectores populorum et Catholici ex toto terrarum orbe, omnes demum quibus sancta sunt gentium et naturæ jura, certarunt inquirere, qua potissimum ratione ac ope conniti præstet ut inhumanum illud commercium evellatur radicitus. Solemnis Conventus non ita pridem Bruxellis actus, quo Legati Principum Europæ congressi sunt, ac recentior cœtus privatorum virorum, qui eodem spectantes magno animo Lutetiam convenere, manifesto portendunt tanta vi et constantia Nigritarum causam defensum iri, quanta est ea qua premuntur ærurnarum moles. Quare oblatam iterum occasionem nolumus omittere, ut meritas agamus laudes et gratias Europæ principibus ceterisque bonæ voluntatis hominibus, atque a summo Deo precamur enixe, ut eorum consiliis et orsis tanti operis prosperos dare velit eventus.

At vero præter tuendæ libertatis curam gravior alia pressius attingit

apostolicum ministerium Nostrum, quod Nos curare jubet, ut in Africæ regionibus propagetur Evangelii doctrina, quæ illarum incolas sedentes in tenebris, a cæca superstitione offusis, illustret divinæ veritatis luce, per quam nobiscum fiant participes hereditatis Regni Dei. Id autem eo curamus enixius, quod illi, hac luce recepta, etiam humani servitutis ab se jugum excutient. Ubi enim christiani mores legesque vigent, ubi religio sic homines instituit, ut justitiam servant atque in honore habeant humanam dignitatem, ubi late spiritus manavit fraternæ caritatis, quam Christus nos docuit, ibi neque servitus, nec feritas, neque barbaria extare potest; sed floret morum suavitas, et civili ornata cultu christiana libertas.—Plures jam Apostolici viri, quasi Christi milites antesignani, adire regiones illas, ibique ad fratrum salutem non sudorem modo sed vitam ipsam profuderunt. Sed *messis quidem multa, operarii autem pauci*; quare opus est, ut alii quamplures eodem acti Spiritu Dei, nulla verentes discrimina, incommoda, et labores, ad eas regiones pergant ubi probrosum illud commercium exercetur, allaturi illarum incolis doctrinam Christi veræ libertati conjunctam.—Verum tanti operis aggressio copias flagitat ejus amplitudini pares. Non enim sine ingenti sumptu prospici potest Missionariorum institutioni, longis itineribus, parandis ædibus, templis excitandis et instruendis, aliisque id genus necessariis, quæ quidem impendia per aliquot annos sustinenda erunt, donec in iis locis ubi consederint evangelii præcones, suis se sumptibus tueri possint. Utinam Nobis vires suppetere quibus possemus hoc onus suscipere! At quum votis Nostris obsistant graves, in quibus versamur, rerum angustiae, te, Venerabilis Frater, aliosque sacrorum Antistites et Catholicos omnes paterna voce compellamus, et Vestrae eorumque caritati commendamus opus tam sanctum et salutare. Omnes enim participes ejus optamus fieri, exigua licet collata stipe, ut dispartitum in plures onus levius cuique toleratu sit, atque ut in omnes effundatur gratia Christi, de cujus regni propugnatione agitur, eaque cunctis pacem, veniam peccatorum, et lectissima quæque munera impertiat.

Propterea constituimus, ut quotannis, qua die in quibusque locis Epiphaniæ Domini celebrantur mysteria, in subsidium memorati operis pecunia stipis instar corrogetur. Hanc autem solemnem diem præ ceteris elegimus, quia, uti probe intelligis, Venerabilis Frater, ea die Filius Dei primitus sese gentibus revelavit dum Magis videndum se præbuit, qui ideo a S. Leone Magno, decessore Nostro, scite dicti sunt *vocationis nostræ fideique primitiæ*. Itaque bona spe nitimur fore, ut



Christus Dominus permotus caritate et precibus filiorum, qui veritatis lucem acceperunt, revelatione divinitatis suæ etiam miserrimam illam humani generis partem illustret, eamque a superstitionis cœno et ærumnosa conditione, in qua tamdiu abjecta et neglecta jacet, eripiat.

Placet autem Nobis, ut pecunia, prædicta die collecta in ecclesiis et sacellis subjectis jurisdictioni tuæ, Romam mittatur ad Sacrum Consilium Christiano nomini propagando. Hujus porro munus erit partiendi eam pecuniam inter Missiones quæ *ad delendam potissimum servitutem* in Africæ regionibus extant aut instituentur : cujus partitionis hic modus erit, ut pecunia profecta ex nationibus, quæ suas habent catholicas missiones ad vindicandos in libertatem servos, ut memoravimus, istis missionibus sustentandis juvandisque addicatur. Reliquam vero stipem idem Sacrum Consilium, cui earumdum missionum necessitates compertæ sunt, inter egentiores prudenti judicio partietur.

Equidem non ambigimus, quin vota Nostra pro infelicibus Afris concepta, benigne excipiat dives in misericordia Deus, ac tu, Venerabilis Frater, ultro collaturus sis studium operamque tuam, ut eâ expleantur cumulate.—Confidimus insuper, per hoc temporarium ac peculiare subsidium, quod fideles conferent ad inhumani commercii labem abolendam et sustentandos evangelii nuncios in locis ubi illud viget, nihil imminutum iri de liberalitate qua Catholicas missiones adjuvare solent collata stipe in Institutum quod Lugduni conditum a *propagatione fidei* nomen accepit. Salutare hoc opus, quod fidelium studiis pridem commendavimus, hac nunc opportunitate oblata novo ornamus laudis testimonio, optantes ut late porrigat beneficentiam suam et læta floreat prosperitate. Interim Tibi, Venerabilis Frater, Clero, et fidelibus pastoralis vigilantia tuæ commissis, Apostolicam Benedictionem peramanter impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum, die xx Novembris anno MDCCCXC, Pontificatus Nostri decimo tertio.

LEO PP. XIII.

OFFICIAL LETTER OF CARDINAL RAMPOLLA  
concerning  
the attitude of the Holy See towards the various forms  
of government.

We publish the following letter addressed by the Pontifical Secretary of State to the Bishop of Saint Flour as a direct evidence against the gratuitous assertions which have been recently made in France and elsewhere to the effect that the Holy See had manifested its dissatisfaction with the republican form of government as unfavorable to the maintenance of the principle of authority. The clergy must be perfectly familiar with the Catholic teaching on this subject, and we give the letter here simply as an official document to which it may be necessary to refer at an opportune time. Able refutations of the assertions referred to have already been made in the English press, notably one by the Archbishop of Dublin.

*Illustrissime et Reverendissime Domine,*

Redditæ mihi sunt litteræ ab Amplitudine Tua die xix novembris datæ, quibus erat injecta mentio dissidii sententiarum quod nuper excitum est in Galliis super re gravissima, quod dissidium eo magis abesse oporteret, quo magis necessaria est inter catholicos omnes summa voluntatum conjunctio.

Quæ mens ac sententia sit Apostolicæ Sedis ea super re, facile dignoscere potes ex doctrina explicata in actis quæ ab eadem prodire. Patet ex illis catholicam Ecclesiam, cujus divina missio tempora et loca omnia complectitur, nihil in sua constitutione et doctrinis habere quod ab aliqua abhorreat reipublicæ forma, quum singulæ optimum civitatis statum parare ac tueri possint, si juste ac prudenter adhibeantur. Scilicet Ecclesia assurgens supra mutabiles imperii formas ac contentiones et studia partium, spectat imprimis religionis incrementa et animarum salutem, quod bonum supremum est, cui curando ac provehendo studium operamque omnem sedulo debet conferre.

Hæc cogitans et animo intendens Apostolica Sedes, traditionem sequens ætatum omnium non modo, civiles potestates observat (sive unius, sive plurium imperio regatur respublica), sed etiam cum iis agit missis exceptisque nunciis et legatis, et consilia confert ad transigenda negotia et definiendas quæstiones quæ mutuas rationes Ecclesiæ et reipublicæ attingunt. Perfunctio hujus muneris, cujus amplitudo humanas res supereminet, nullum infert præjudicium juribus quæ forte ad aliquos spectare possunt, velut sapienter declaravit sanctæ memoriæ Pontifex Gregorius XVI, decessorum suorum vestigia sequens, in Litteris Apostolicis die vii Augusti datis anno 1831, quarum initium: "Sollicitudo."<sup>1</sup>

Itaque eodem studio curandi religionis bonum quo ducitur Sancta Sedes in negotiis agendis colendisque mutuis officiis cum rectoribus civitatum, ducantur etiam fideles oportet in actibus non modo privatæ vitæ sed etiam publicæ. Quapropter, ubi id postulent religionis rationes, nec ulla justa ac peculiaris causa impediatur, par est ut fideles ad rem publicam capessendam accedant ut eorum industria et auctoritate institutiones ac leges ad justitiæ normam exigantur, ac religionis spiritus et benefica vis in universam rei publicæ compagem influat.

Jamvero quod ad catholicos attinet qui in Galliis sunt, dubitandum non est quin opportunum ac salutare opus gesturi sint, si, perpensa conditione in qua jampridem eorum patria versatur, eam velint inire viam quæ illos ad nobilem, quem dixi, finem expeditius et efficacius perducatur.

Ad hoc opus efficiendum, multum conferre potest sapiens et concors episcoporum actio, multum fidelium ipsorum prudentia, plurimum denique vis ipsa progredientis ætatis. Interim vero, cum necessitas tuendi religionem et principia quibus socialis ordo continetur curas in præsens in se convertat virorum omnium quibus humanæ societatis salus cordi est, expedit summopere ut Gallici fideles in unum consentiant et hanc sibi provinciam suscipiant, in qua actuosas vires ac zelum magnanimum exerceant.

Qui vellent Ecclesiam viresque catholicas in aciem angustiore de-  
ducere iisque uti ad concertationes studiis partium excitatas, hi averterent

<sup>1</sup> Si. . . (a Nobis vel a successoribus Nostri) cum iis qui alio quocumque gubernationis genere rei publicæ præsent, tractari aut sanciri aliquid contigerit, nullum ex actibus, ordinationibus et conventionibus id generis, jus iisdem attributum, acquisitum, probatumque sit, ac nullum adversus ceterorum jura. . . discrimen jacturæque et imputationis argumentum illatum censeri possit ac debeat.



animum a cogitatione bonorum maximorum ad quæ vires illas converti oportet; frustra illas absumerent nullum salutis vel gloriæ fructum edituras; gravem denique inferrent illustri Gallorum nationi perniciem, sinentes in ea imminui ea summa recti verique principia, ea opera egregia et catholicas traditiones, quæ quasi communis gentis thesaurus validas illi semper præbuere vires et præclara laudis ornamenta.

Ceterum mihi certa spes inest fore ut Galliarum catholici, quorum compertum est eximium religionis studium et singularis caritas in patriam, probe percipiant quæ sint officia sibi ab hac temporum necessitate imposita, et dicto audientes pastoribus suis opus aggrediantur summa animorum consensione et conjunctione virium quæ sola potest tutò ad optatum finem perducere.

Hac fiducia fretus, sensus Tibi profiteri gaudeo peculiaris existimationis, qua sum ex animo, Amplitudinis Tuæ, etc.,

M. CARD. RAMPOLLA.

### Aquæ Benedictio in festo Epiphaniæ.

*Dubium.* Quum in nonnullis Diœcesibus usus vigeat perficiendi in Vigilia, vel in festo Epiphaniæ Domini solemnem aquæ benedictionem peculiari adhibito ritu, a Sacra Rituum Congregatione jampridem quæsitum fuerat, an ejusmodi ritus licite servari valeat. Sacra vero eadem congregatio, antequam ejusmodi quæstionem definiret, voluit ut ea sub omni respectu expenderetur, simul exquisitis virorum in rebus liturgicis apprime peritorum votis, præsertim quoad hujusce ritus varietatem, quæ in supradictis ecclesiis obtinet, propter Sacræ Liturgiæ latinæ a græca, unde ritus ipse desumptus est, discrepantiam; quæ vota una cum cæteris omnibus documentis rem ipsam respicientibus a R. P. D. Promotore S. Fidei collecta, additoque novo præfati ritus schemate ab ipsomet exarato, sacri coetus discussioni subjicerentur.

His itaque comparatis, Emi. et Rmi. Patres Sacris tuendis Ritibus præpositi in ordinariis comitiis subsignata die coadunatis, accuratum examen instituerunt super natura enuntiati ritus, ejusque ab Orientali derivatione, nec non super causis

quæ illius usum in aliquibus ecclesiis latini ritus consuluerunt, inspectis insuper variis ipsius formulis hincinde usitatis; ac demum perpensis rationibus quibus permitti posset, vel tolerari ejusmodi ritus, saltem in locis ubi inductus fuit, prohibendi tamen ne alibi unquam adhibeatur, utpote omnino proprius Græcæ Ecclesiæ, atque ab indole latini ritus plane alienus. Hinc per me infrascriptum Cardinalem eidem Congregationi Præfectum proposito dubio: *An in aquæ benedictione quæ in Vigilia vel in festo Epiphaniæ in aliquibus locis cum aliqua solemnitate fieri consuevit, permittendus sit ritus alius quam qui præscribitur a Rituali Romano ad faciendum aquam benedictam?*

Emi et Rmi Patres Sacris tuendis Ritibus præpositi, omnibus in re mature expensis, rescribendum censuerunt:

*Negative.* Die 17 Maji 1890. Quibus per infrascriptum Secretarium SSmo Dno Nostro Leoni Papæ XIII relatis, Sanctitas Sua Rescriptum Sacræ Congregationis ratum habuit et confirmavit. Die 11 Junii anno eodem.

L. S. C. Cardinal. ALOISI MASELLA, S. R. C. Præf.

Vincentius Nussi, S. R. C. Secr.

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#### BOOK REVIEW.

**ANALECTA LITURGICA.** Fascic. VI. 1890. W. H. James Weale, London.

Mr. Weale's collection does not grow less interesting as it continues to appear. We have in the present issue the Kalendarium Narbonense of 1528, and the Lubicense of 1486, reaching to the 22 October. These Kalendaria are mainly remarkable as proving the permanency and harmony of Catholic devotion throughout different ages and countries. Now and then we meet with peculiarities of rite and festivals which have gone out of use, such as for example the feast called "Divisio Apostolorum," celebrated in the office of Luebeck and elsewhere on the 15th of July, and for which there is also a special hymn given before.

Of *Prose* we have here quite a long and interesting series. One hymn which will strike the reader at once because of its title, is "De

Beatis Sororibus Gloriosæ Virginis" (No. 276). The opinion which was prevalent at the date of the missal containing this hymn (1543) has been long ago condemned by the Catholic sense of the theological world. But our wonder that men like Gerson, the Chancellor of the Paris University, and Dr. Eck, the opponent of Luther, should have defended the belief that St. Anna was married to St. Joachim, to Cleophas, and to Solomas, is lessened when we remember the exaggerated devotion of another faction, who maintained the opposite extreme, namely, that St. Anna conceived by purely miraculous intervention. This latter opinion has been explicitly censured by the Congregation of the Index as *cultus indiscretus*, whilst the other has been allowed to die out. Accordingly the verses—

O quam felix, quam præclara  
Anna mater, et quam cara  
Trinam gignens filiam!

may be looked upon as a liturgical curiosity rather than an offence against that *pietas fidei*, which inspires Catholics of a less turbulent religious age to believe that the Bl. Virgin was an only child. What has been said of this hymn is equally true of the one entitled "De Sancta Anna," showing that the belief referred to was not confined to France alone. In the latter prose the following passage occurs :—

Anna parit tres Marias  
Quarum primam Isaias  
Prædixit divinitus, etc.

Another hymn belonging to this category is that taken from the Missal of Rennes, 1492. It is entitled "De Tribus Sanctis Mariis," and begins :—

Ex Anna est orta splendida maris stella,  
Exaltata supra sidera cœli cuncta,  
Trium sanctarum sororum primitia, etc.—No. 310.

Indeed, we know nothing of the parentage of Our Bl. Lady except what tradition tells us. An old Roman Breviary, of 1536, names a holy man Garizi as the father of our Bl. Lady.

Of the universal belief at this age in the Immaculate Conception of the Bl. Virgin we have ample evidence in the hymns then in common use in the churches of France and Germany. There are several of them in this collection.



An attractive hymn is that which is assigned for Tuesday after Pentecost. It belongs to the Church of Auxerre, and begins :—

Veni, Sancte Spiritus,  
Nos perfunde cœlitus  
Rore novæ gratiæ, etc.

As regards the last verse of the third strophe, we would suppose that the "*planta morum germina*" (which the learned commentator deems superfluous and interfering with the rhythm) was intended as a substitute for the line "*nostra delens crimina*," and thus finds its place, not without good grace and, as it seems to us, considerable improvement of the sound. There are numerous other hymns in this collection, which are remarkable for their beauty and adaptability to the devotional service of the Church in our day. Few of our modern compositions can equal the fulness of sentiment and sweet simplicity of these medieval chants, and we have no doubt the author who has brought them to the knowledge of the public in their present complete and critical form does not wish to serve the cause of sacred archæology alone, but also that of practical devotion.

**SHORT SERMONS on the Gospels for every Sunday in the year.**

By Rev. N. M. Redmond. 1890. Fr. Pustet & Co. New York and Cincinnati.

These sermons were originally written at the request of Bishop Marty, to serve the scattered people in the out-missions of Dakotah, "who could not well avail themselves of the blessing of regular Sunday instruction." They are on the whole rather exhortations than doctrinal expositions, but pithy, full of healthy teaching on the practical duties of Catholics, and not without that peculiar ingredient of feeling which reaches the heart of the hearers.

**SERMONS AND LECTURES.** By Rev. J. F. Loughlin, D.D.—H. L. Kierner & Co., Philadelphia. 1890.

Although the writer protests in his dedication to Bishop Shanley, that these sermons and lectures are juvenile productions, of which he himself doubts whether they deserve publication, most of them bear the stamp of maturity, and all show elaborate care both in composition and in language. Among the nine subjects there is a sermon on the Bl. Sacrament, another on St. John, and a lecture on the Isle of Destiny, which are especially attractive. The paper entitled "the Sixth Nicene

Canon and the Papacy," reprinted from the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, is not less readable because it is more learned than the rest.

DE PHILOSOPHIA MORALI PRÆLECTIONES quas in Collegio Georgiopolitano Soc. Jesu anno MDCCCLXXXIX—X habuit P. Nicolaus Russo, ejusdem Soc. Neo Eboraci, Benziger Fratres, 1890. p. 309.

It has been noted elsewhere in the *Review* that our text books of philosophy are steadily assuming a more timely aspect. Manuals of scholastic philosophy printed twenty or more years ago, though marked by sufficient depth and clearness, appear to the average reader to show little bearing of their subject-matter upon contemporary thought. The ancient ghosts of Democritus, Pyrrho, and Epicurus haunt their pages, whilst Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Hegel *et id omne genus* are forever being resurrected, seemingly for the purpose of giving them a disgraceful funeral. But of living thinkers doing battle for or against sound philosophy, there is unfrequent mention. Still, he were a superficial reader who would disparage the philosophers of a generation ago, because they did not take nominal note of their contemporaries. The errors with which they deal, whether born in the far off twilight of philosophy's history, or in the brighter light of modern times, have never died outright. They live to day, it may be in new guise and name, but substantially unchanged. It was only a week ago that we listened to a public eulogy of Democritus. The *noumenon* of Kant is the unknowable of Herbert Spencer. Hume's scepticism is the prototype of to-days "cultured" agnosticism. To the student who is able to grasp and unfold radical principles it makes little difference when a false system sprung up or by whom founded or supported. He holds the secret of its evil and of its good, of its falsity and its comingling verity. For the majority of students, however, it is better that systems be exposed as they exist in the writings of contemporary, and, especially *apud nos*, American and English thinkers. This good point is particularly noticeable in our more recent philosophical works. We have a sample of this timeliness in these lectures on moral philosophy delivered during the past year by Fr. Russo in the Jesuit College at Georgetown. In them we have the ethical principles of Catholic philosophy well established and in proportion to the compass of the work well developed. This is especially true of the chapter on the first principles of morals concerning man's final end. A mark, how-

ever, of its timely character is, for instance, its treatment of the question regarding the right of property. This subject is of course radically discussed by all recent writers on natural ethics, but our students will be more deeply interested and better equipped when they see its inner principles in contact with the theories of a writer like Henry George. Fr. Russo has extracted the leading objections against landed property found mostly in Mr. George's *Progress and Poverty*, and to each he presents an apposite solution.

Another sign of the living thought in this work is its handling of the difficult problem concerning the relations between Capital and Labor. This burning question is seldom discussed by our ordinary Manual of Ethics. Fr. Russo enters on it, as he says, "*non sine quadam animi trepidatione*;" and well he may, for whilst its roots are in morals, its trunk and branches go off among the sciences of economics and jurisprudence. Nevertheless he exposes the moral principles clearly and quite fully, especially in relation to the fixing of just wages, and to labor or capital organizations and strikes.

Still another subject of living interest here treated is the school question. The duty and consequent right of educating their offspring is shown to belong to parents. "The State, therefore, cannot arrogate to itself such right, and much less compel parents to send their children to public schools. Its function as regards education is performed by supplying material aids, building colleges and similar institutions, and providing for their proper government." This is a prudent statement of the general teaching of Catholic moralists, and cannot be gainsaid by any one holding sound elementary principles on the nature and scope of domestic and civil society. The State, of course, has no native right to educate. The drawing out of mental faculties does not enter *per se* into the external order, the maintenance and perfecting of which is the end of the State. We think, however, that *per accidens* the State may acquire the right of exacting from its subjects a certain measure of education, and that in ethical treatises intended to inform the minds of our youth it is well to note this accidental right. It seems plain that in a country like ours, whither emigrants flock from almost every nation under the sun, the civil power may require and exact that amount of education which is necessary to bring and keep the heterogenous mass in good order. These lectures on Ethics, added to their author's *Summa Philosophica*, make a good text for a Seminary course of Philo-



sophy. They can readily be mastered within the average time allotted to that course, and still leave opportunity for an introduction to some kindred work of St. Thomas.

**A HAPPY YEAR :** or the year sanctified by meditating on the maxims and sayings of the Saints. By the Abbé La Sausse. Translated from the French by Mrs. James O'Brien.—New York, Cincinnati, Chicago. Benziger Bros. 1890.

A timely gift, which will hardly disappoint those who wish to lead a devout life amid the occupations of the world, and find it difficult to make a regular morning meditation. Spiritual books translated from the French are rarely satisfactory to the English reader. This is not due so much to the difference in the two idioms, as to the difference in the genius of piety, if I am allowed to use such an expression,—there being a marked distinction in the quality of imagination in the two nations. Ordinarily the sensitive devotion of the French can only be acquired at a very early age through education; its mere adoption savors of affectation. This book is rather an exception to the rule, since, avoiding the French methods of eliciting devotion, it simply groups pithy maxims of the saints in such a way as to bear on the exercise of a certain virtue during the month. Each day marks a different aspect of this virtue, and a short prayer at the end facilitates its acquisition. We heartily recommend this book for those especially who are inclined to omit their morning meditation because the ordinary systems require too much mental exertion.

**JUS CANONICUM** generale distributum in articulos quos collegit et ordinavit A. Pillet, presbyt. Cambr., juris canon. prof. ordin.—Pariisiis: Lethielleux, edit. 1890.

**COMPENDIUM JURIS CANONICI** ad usum cleri et seminariorum hujus regionis accommodatum. Auctore Rev. S. B. Smith, S. T. D.—Neo Eboraci: Benziger Fratr. 1890.

The first of these two books is a remarkably brief and lucid exposition of Catholic Canon Law. At first sight it would seem as if so small a volume could hardly give a complete survey of the matter, yet the author has so carefully avoided everything of a purely argumentative and historical character, in which the text books on Canon Law usually abound, as to retain the compact kernel of principles and laws holding the substance of the old Corpus Juris and the Tridentine Decrees, together with those essential modifications which have been added in

later times. An appendix gives the Syllabus, the Constitution of Pius IX *Apostolicæ Sedis*, and the more recent document of the S. Congregation, *Instructio de causis clericorum*, approved by Leo XIII in 1886.

But whilst there is no attempt at demonstration, but rather at accurate definition, which fact makes the book a good text for the class, the professor or closer inquirer into the *rationale* and history of the subject or its application is aided by copious and accurate marginal references to larger works of both ancient and recent date. These comprise well known authorities in Canon Law, such as Reiffenstuel, Ferraris, Benedict XIV, and the later ones—like Soglia, Vecchiotti, Camillis, Santi, Grandclaude, Craisson, Philippus de Angelis, and others, whose name is a guarantee for the correctness of the principles of Dr. Pillet. Whilst the method of the work is catechetical, and well adapted for easy mastery, the disposition of the subject-matter hardly differs from that ordinarily pursued in similar works; viz., the opening chapter, *De Legitus*, finds its application in those *De Personis, Rebus, Judiciis* with their different branches.

Whilst this little book, if sufficiently known, will be likely to take the place of larger texts hitherto used in our classes of Theology, as being more comprehensive and practical because free from that local bias which seems to cling to more pretentious treatises, it requires for that very reason a supplement, which makes the general principles and laws applicable to the several local conditions of the Church in different parts of the Christian world. Such a supplement we have in the above work of Dr. Smith, whose method in commenting on our national Church-legislation has done more to make it appreciated and understood than any other adopted for that purpose.

The collected Acts and Decrees of the Plenary Councils of Baltimore represent a digest of Ecclesiastical Law and Discipline which can hardly be surpassed in point of practical worth. The value of this code as a norm of local legislation lies principally in this, that its statutes, whilst they are definite, are not so stringent as to lose their application by a change of circumstances. This characteristic is a result of their peculiar growth. They were made to answer missionary conditions, which implied not only rapid changes from one social state to another under the same hierarchical constitution, but the Catholic legislators who put them in form had to provide in turn a rule of harmonious government to suit simultaneously the most diverse elements. That the canon law

of the Church should allow of such an adaptation without becoming untrue to the principles of her existing laws is one of the most striking proofs of her inherent and divinely secured wisdom. If these decrees are carried out upon the lines which prudent judgment and unselfish zeal suggest, they will be found to answer every difficulty in practical administration. Appeals are, on the whole, not the offsprings of a necessary doubt as to the interpretation of laws, but often simply attest the quarrelsome disposition of those who do not reckon it a loss to themselves if they create public scandals for the purpose of testing the strength of their self-will. But the excellence of our constitutions is no guarantee of our apprehending their proper spirit. This requires training. The seminaries are the places where respect for the law and for authority must be inculcated, and inculcated not by the recital of commandments and the enforcing of subjection, but rather by an appeal to the reasonableness, the absolute necessity, and the all-sided advantages of exact and consistent discipline. Neither age, nor dignity, nor individual virtue of any sort can dispense a body of men who are to work for a common end from the observance of a judiciously enforced discipline according to laws made with a view to serve the end for which they combine. Order is the law which nature points out for the preservation of every organism, material or spiritual. If the members of any organization happen to be intelligent, it can only have the effect of making the observance of order more easy to them, since there is a pleasure in recognizing the wisdom of a law, distinct from the other advantages of its observance; but the superior intelligence of the members of an organization can never dispense with the discipline by which its object is to be secured and maintained. Hence the necessity of mastering the laws both in their principles and application. This is the purpose which such books as the above accomplish. Dr. Smith greatly facilitates the mastery of the essential points in our own code of ecclesiastical law by the plain and clear manner of his writing. Where the terminology is likely to present any difficulty to those not familiar with the old curial and code styles, he puts the English terms in parenthesis, and frequently refers to that other useful book from his own pen, the *Elements of Eccl. Law*, the popularity of which has been proved by several editions.

We have not been able to find any errors in the book; a few things we miss however. The question defining the right of suspended clerics to sustenance has received some light from Fr. Nic. Nilles, S. J., and is



important. On the other hand, it would hardly seem necessary even to mention forms of legislation, etc., which have not only fallen into desuetude, but never found warrant under other conditions than where Church and State were a unit for the reformation of clergy and people. Thus nothing would be lost of the integrity of the chapter on *Pœnæ Vindicativæ temporales* by omitting—nor is there any call for emphasizing by translation—the barbarian practices of a feudal age, the rationale of which no man understands properly except in the light of the history of the times which called them forth. However, in this the author simply follows other modern canonists, who treat the same subject in the traditional way.

**CURSUS SCRIPTURÆ SACRÆ:** Commentarius in S. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas auctore Rudolpho Cornely, S. J.—Prior Epistola ad Corinthios. Parisiis: Sumptibus P. Lethielleux, Edit. 1890. Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati.

The high standard of criticism adopted by the learned Jesuits to whose scholarship and united aim we owe the monumental work of the present *Cursus S. Scripturæ* is fully maintained in this Commentary on the first Epistle to the Corinthians. Next to the letter addressed to the Romans, these two epistles written to the Christians of Corinth are the most remarkable tracts on dogmatic and moral theology which we have from the Apostle of the Gentiles. As theologian, he is more profound than any of the other inspired writers. He lacks indeed the lofty tranquillity of St. John, whose steady gaze penetrates the serene regions of mystic theology, opening the way for those whose lightsome hearts are readily lifted through affection. But if the beloved Disciple rises on angelic wing to the eternal light of love, St. Paul snatches the willing flame from on high and carries it to men, casting about him the love which burns too greatly to be contained within his own bosom. He understands men. He values the price of the gift bequeathed to them in the sacramental graces flowing from Christ's sacrifice on the Cross. Hence we find him so apt a teacher in regard to the doctrines of the Holy Eucharist, the Real Presence, Matrimony, the Resurrection of the flesh, the disciplinary and dogmatic authority of the Church, etc.

The authenticity of these letters never having been questioned on any solid ground, the commentator loses no time in refuting the vaguely supported assertions of Bauer, and more recently of Lohmann, who seem bent on holding an anomalous position in this regard. We do not care

to enter here into a discussion as to the time when this epistle was written. Fr. Cornely puts the date in the year 58, and he places the letter to the Romans after it in the order of time. Agus has lately shown good reason why the letter to the Romans should be assigned to the year 54. There is evidence of an immense amount of careful and critical labor in the examination of the text of St. Paul. Fr. Cornely follows the Vatican Codex, as giving in many respects a preferable reading to that of the Vulgate edition of Pope Clement. But we are never left in doubt as to the value of the commentator's choice, for he adds in every important instance the varying readings of the Codices Alphabetici, which, together with the Polyglot editions of earlier date, he has consulted in great number. In adjusting his interpretation, he takes account of the notable writers who have successively explained this epistle, that is, the Fathers of the Church, both Greek and Latin. The commentators of a later date are divided into three groups: from the ninth to the fifteenth, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth, and those who wrote during the present century. The reason of this division is obvious. Nor are the Protestant and rationalistic critics passed over wherever their opinion rests on solid argument.

Incidentally much light is thrown on questions of dogma and moral theology. Nowhere do we recognize the influence of exegetical interpretation upon questions of ecclesiastical discipline better than in the treatment of the Pauline doctrine regarding mixed marriages, p. 179. The teaching of Trent and the decisions of the Sovereign Pontiffs on various occasions are shown to be in perfect harmony with the inspired instinct of St. Paul, which Gregory XIII has well expressed in his Constitution *Populis et nationibus*: "Connubia inter infideles contracta vera quidem, non tamen adeo rata esse dicit, ut necessitate suadente solvi nequeant."—We can but urge the student to make himself further familiar with the details of this work, which bears exceptional testimony to the excellence of the Apostolic teaching, extending to almost every portion of Catholic theology.

**LEBEN DER ALLERSELIGSTEN JUNGFRAU UND GOTTES-MUTTER MARIA.** Auszug aus der "Geistlichen Stadt Gottes," von Maria von Jesus. Herausgegeben von P. Franz Vogl, C. SS. R.—1890. Regensburg, New York, and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet.

The life of Our Lord on earth is the pattern of man's perfect life. It absorbs in one grand central act all the exalted teaching of the Old and

New Testaments. The first and by far the longest period of that life is but briefly mentioned by the Evangelists. They speak of the birth, the childhood and youth in Bethlehem and Egypt, the momentary appearance in the Temple school of Jerusalem, upon which follow the silent years in the peaceful home of Nazareth. Three years it took to establish the doctrine and to outline the economy of the future Christian Church; three days to drain the chalice of bitterest suffering of mind and body, and three hours to consume the Sacrifice of the Redemption by the uplifting of the cross. But the thirty years that preceded these great facts were the training time, so to speak, which the Most High had designed for the fitting out of the Son of Man for His divine mission. The imagination cannot run over that space of time without being arrested by the picture of the lovely Virgin Mother, on whose bosom rests the heavenly Child, into whose eye the growing boy looks as into an immaculate mirror, fixing there the image of His own uncreated perfection. He was sweetly subject to her, and if the Apostles, who in later years were His companions, could interpret the divine Teacher to us, how much more she, a true daughter of David, whose royal blood coursed in His veins.

Little as the Gospels contain of our Bl. Lady's life, they tell enough to show how loftily intimate was the union to the last moment, when our divine Lord gave with His dying lips the care of her to one whom of all others He loved with a marked affection. There is a wonderful depth of pathos in that bequest wherein Our Lord consigns to a mutual love the two souls on earth who had come in closer contact with His Sacred Heart than any others. Had we no further key to Mary's position in the divinely human affection of Our Lord, it would suffice to paint the happiest scenes of domestic life in Nazareth and give us the fairest portrait of the Virgin daughter of Sion.

But we have more. The apocryphal Gospels may be credited with some authority, although they cannot rank as inspired writings. They are nevertheless so old as to represent a large measure of worthy tradition. Apart from these, we have accounts from holy persons who, appearing from time to time in the history of the Church, have said wonderful things under peculiar circumstances, throwing light upon the life of Our Bl. Lady as upon that of Our Lord. Whilst these revelations might at times be regarded as the dreams of exalted piety, there were as often such unmistakable evidences of a supernatural influence, that only a fanatical sceptic could refuse to admit their weight. It is not a



mark of credulity to suppose that God might make known to certain chosen souls some secrets of His dealings with men, whether the object be warning, or edification, or simply the approval of divine love. As God walked with Enoch and dealt familiarly with the prophets and seers of old, as He revealed to Samuel the details of Heli's life and approaching end, without apparently any purpose that could not have been accomplished otherwise, so we need see no repugnance in His lifting the veil from the inner sanctuary of His earthly life to reward or instruct those who affectionately meditate His words and strive to imitate His life on earth.

Superstition and faith, though opposite, lie very close to each other. The dreams of narrow minds, and revelation made to chosen souls that have divested themselves of egotism, are often hardly distinguishable from one another. To ascertain their real character, we must not simply scan the results, but examine the sources and the intermediate channels whence they flow. Benedict has summarized, in a very thorough treatise on this subject, the methods by which the true ecstatic may be recognized from the hysteric devotee who pretends to private revelation. If we hear of a devout peasant girl like Catherine Emmerich explaining with great simplicity, yet wonderful minuteness, the manner of Our Lord's acting on a certain occasion but briefly mentioned by the Evangelist, we are inclined to attribute such a picture to the pious imagination of a child whose mind has become habituated to thinking of the subject by the reading of the Gospel narrative. But when we discover that the poor invalid, speaking under pain and with reluctance of the matter, is perfectly acquainted with the topography of the Holy Land and the surrounding countries; when she gives with perfect accuracy the original names in a foreign tongue of places which have long ceased to exist, mentions persons and laws and customs with which she could have had no means of becoming familiar, and the knowledge of which is confined only to special students of Biblical archæology; if her statements in regard to distances, to the value of coins, the Hebrew and Phœnician measures, the fashions of dress in different classes of Jewish and Pagan society, and phrases and epithets in a foreign tongue hardly spoken for centuries,—if all these things tally with the latest researches of Biblical archæologists, we may have reason to doubt whether there are here only idle imaginings. If, then, all this knowledge is tested by men of every shade of belief, yet of thorough education; if the ecstatic is confronted

with pretended contradiction of her own, every word of hers being committed to writing; if this examination is carried on for years with every precaution against imposition; if the past is examined almost to the single days of her life, and it is found that, the few years of her childhood excepted, her life was spent on the bed of sickness, with no books about her but the "Following of Christ," and that the lovely disposition of the maiden, her patience, simplicity, and purity, have been without interruption a source of edification, notwithstanding the suspicions of the curious and countless trials brought unnecessarily upon her from strangers; if all this be demonstrated beyond doubt of reasonable men—then we may lawfully ask, whence does the extraordinary knowledge of this child come? Yet the theologian would demand still more security before allowing that there is here a supernatural agency at work. We know that the angel of darkness envelops himself at times in a cloud of light. Hence the question turns upon the inner life of the ecstatic, apart from the visions which she claims. Thence the motives are judged which might prompt any such manifestation. Does she desire them? Does she show any anxiety to communicate them? Is there any evidence of vanity? Any reluctance to attribute them to mere imagination? Above all, is the will active in eliciting them, or do they come spontaneously in prayer or Holy Communion? Is there throughout an absence of those disturbances of temperament which belong to the human spirit, or does on the contrary every act evince that perfect tranquillity and repose which is the proof of union with the divine will under all circumstances, even those most trying to human nature? And when all this is established, when the whole past life and present actions have been examined to see whether they support the assumption of any supernatural communication—only then does the Church give her passive approbation to the publication of these personal revelations. Even in these cases they only have a private and devotional character, that is to say, they are looked upon as edifying narratives, which may warm the heart to a greater appreciation of divine truth and aid the mind to their easier understanding. No dogmatic definition is ever built upon them. They are never objects of faith, but only of piety. This is their limit and their advantage. Such is the value of the "Mystic City of God." We have dwelt longer than might seem needful upon the general character of such works; because it would be idle to recommend it in any other way. There is a tendency in these days to make light of the things which in

the ages of faith were readily understood and believed, and to which at times perhaps too much importance has been given. But when scepticism is rife there is need of enforcing greater reverence for reading such as this.

The saintly Mary of Agreda was a model of holiness to those who lived with her in monastic seclusion. When her singular knowledge of Holy Scripture, of philosophy and theology, and of the exact sciences, which proved that she had an intuition into the laws of God's creation, became known to those outside, she was sought after by men of profound learning and high estate. King Philip IV. of Spain consulted her in all important and difficult matters concerning his reign and the doubts of his soul.

For more than ten years the V. Mary of Agreda had been under an impulse of committing to writing what presented itself before her mind relative to the life of the Bl. Virgin. Nevertheless she did not act until the learned ascetic P. Andrea de la Torre, discerning that the impulse came from God, obliged her to do so as her spiritual superior at the time. She began the work of the "Mystic City" in 1637, and completed it some years later. The confessor extraordinary who visited the community periodically, learning of the existence of this book, yet not being told of the circumstances under which it had been composed, condemned it at once as the idle and dangerous dreaming of an exaggerated devotion, which could only foster pride, and hence bade her throw the manuscript into the fire. This she did without the slightest remonstrance or explanation. It was only years afterwards when her ordinary confessor, hearing of this act, commanded her to write anew the entire work. This she did under obedience, and finished it in 1660, a few years before her death. Afterwards the manuscript was examined by a number of theologians and then transmitted to the diocesan bishop of Taragona, who had it again examined, and caused its publication, in 1670, at Madrid.

The seventeenth century was an age of false mysticism, which made caution in the promulgation of such works as this a necessity. Hence the S. Inquisition, not having been previously consulted, forbade for the time the circulation of this book until it had received the proper approbation of the Holy See. This did not take place until nine years later, when Innocent XI sanctioned the publication as free from hetero-



dox teaching. This judgment was subsequently confirmed by Alexander VIII and the S. Congregations.

Nevertheless the Gallican faction of the Sorbonne took exception to statements in the book, notably to the matter regarding the Immaculate Conception. It was a way in which they wished to emphasize their opposition to the Holy See. Against the Doctors of the Sorbonne arose as champions of the book the Universities of Salamanca, Alcalá, Saragossa, and Granada; and later on also the faculties of Toulouse and Louvain. Strange to say, the book appeared on the *Index* in 1704. However the error had crept in, it was promptly removed by order of Pope Clement XI.

The work has been printed in every European language, including a translation in Greek and another in Arabic. Although objections have been raised periodically against the book by those who, like the infamous minister of state Choiseul, saw in it the condemnation of the false theories which they advocated in religion and ethics, the main body of theologians have not only declared it free from all censurable utterance, but of a most edifying and healthy character. There is no good reason for the assertion that a disciple of Duns Scotus had interpolated the manuscript and influenced the theological bias of the book. An erudite apology in five volumes, entitled "*Grandeurs et Apostolat de Marie, ou La Cité Mystique justifié*," appeared some years ago from the pen of a Passionist priest, which disposes of all the objections formerly made against the work. The illustrious Dom Guéranger has also written a spirited defence of the work.

For the rest, the devotional worth of the book is well expressed in the words of the learned Jesuit Mendo, who was appointed official censor of the work. "The reading of this book has with every line aroused fresh fervor and admiration in my soul. I have learnt more from it concerning the things which it treats than from the study of many years in other books. The pointedness and accuracy of expression, the unmistakable clearness of interpretation solving every difficulty, arrest the admiring attention of the reader. It is plain that this doctrine comes from heaven, and that a higher hand has directed this pen. The entire work is a light which illuminates the understanding, a flame which kindles the will and dispels lukewarmness, whilst it excites to the striving after the highest virtue. He who studies in this work will become learned; he who meditates its contents will be drawn on to holiness.

It is a precious fountain opened to enrich the fold of the Church." This judgment has been endorsed by men of greatest authority within the last two centuries.

The German work placed at the head of this review is an extract from the work published in four volumes by Pustet & Co. But in this abbreviated edition the words of the original have been carefully preserved. To many this shorter form will be more directly useful, whether for meditation or instruction. We conclude with the words of Benedict XIV as to the orthodoxy of the teaching contained in the volumes of the V. Mary of Agreda. After making an analysis of the *Mystica Ciudad de Dios*, the Pontiff concludes: "Ex his omnibus ineluctabiliter et evidentissime sequitur: De istarum Revelationum qualitate supernaturali ac divina non est ullo modo dubitandum."

**THE DISAPPEARANCE OF JOHN LONGWORTHY.** By Maurice Francis Egan.—Notre Dame, Ind.: Office of the Ave Maria. 1890.

Mr. Egan shows in all his stories a superior motive. They are real, yet neither commonplace nor ever simply interesting. Whilst he gives us a deeper knowledge of the world, he makes us grow better in doing so, which is assuredly a rare merit. The name of Father Hudson, with whom the author gracefully divides the credit of his inspiration, doubles the value of this little book, for which we bespeak a large circle of readers apart from those who habitually enjoy the pages of that choicest of periodicals, the "Ave Maria."

**SONGS OF THE CATHOLIC YEAR.** By Francis A. Cunningham. Boston: Flynn and Mahony. 1890.

The taste which characterizes the outward form in which these songs are presented to the public is also found within. They breathe intelligent devotion, and in some instances mark the theologically trained mind. "St. Thomas Aquinas" and "Corpus Christi" are full of religious beauty, which is the highest kind of beauty. There is perhaps the faintest want of polish repeatedly noticeable in rhythm and rhyme; but that offends little, considering the general character of the verses, which is edifying throughout.



## BOOKS RECEIVED.

*The mention of books under this head does not preclude further notice of them in subsequent numbers.*

THE YOUNG MAN IN CATHOLIC LIFE. By Condé B. Pallen, Ph. D.—St. Louis: B. Herder. 1891.

TIMOTHEUS. Briefe an einen jungen Theologen. Von Dr. Franz Hettinger.—Freiburg im Breisgau. Herdersche Verlagsbuchhandlung. 1890. B. Herder. St. Louis, Mo.

ERKENNTNISZLEHRE von Dr. Al. Schmid, o. e. Professor an der Universitaet Muenchen. Erster Band, 8<sup>o</sup>, pp. vii, 498.—Zweiter Band, pp. v, 428. Freiburg im Breisgau, Herdersche Verlagshandlung. 1890. B. Herder, St. Louis.

PHILOSOPHIÆ THEORETICÆ INSTITUTIONES, secundum doctrinas Aristotelis et S. Thomæ Aq. traditæ in Pont. Collegio Urbano de Propaganda Fide a Sac. Benedicto Lorenzelli, Philos., S. Theol. utriusq. Juris Doctore. Vol. I., complectens Log. et Metaphys. Generalem. 8<sup>o</sup> pp. 318. Vol. II., complectens Philos. Naturalem et Metaphys. Specialem. Pp. 509—Romæ: Phil. Cuggiani.

THE CHRIST, THE SON OF GOD. A Life of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. By the Abbé Constant Fouard. Translated from the fifth edit., with the author's sanction, by George F. X. Griffith, with an introduction by Cardinal Manning.—Two Volumes.—New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1891.

DIE LEHRE VON DER GENUGTHUUNG Christi theologisch dargestellt und eroertert von Dr. Bernhard Dörholt.—Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. 1891. New York and Cincinnati: Fr. Pustet & Co.

MISSA DE NATIVITATE DOMINI, including Gradual and Offertory for Christmas, for two voices, Soprano and Alto, with organ accompaniment. Composed by Bruno Oscar Klein.—New York: J. Fischer & Bro. 1890.

SUMMA APOLOGETICA de Ecclesia Catholica, ad mentem S. Thomæ Aquinatis. Auctore Fr. J. V. De Groot, Ord. Præd., S. Theol. Lect.—Ratisbonæ: Inst. Libr. pridem G. J. Manz. 1890. Fr. Pustet & Co., New York and Cincinnati.

THEOLOGIA MORALIS juxta doctrinam S. Alphonsi de Liguori, Doctoris Ecclesiæ. Auctore Josepho Aertnys, C. SS. R. Editio altera, aucta et recognita Tom. 1 and 2.

SUPPLEMENTUM AD TRACTATUM de Septimo Decalogi præcepto secundum Jus Civile Gallicum. Paderbornæ, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1890. Fr. Pustet & Co., New York & Cincinnati.



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